terms, as necessary, impossible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c. that they are ready to
think, that to suppose a certain connexion of men’s volitions, without any foregoing motives
or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose
a strong irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stand in the way of, and makes utterly
vain, opposite desires and endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of
brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, pates of brass, and bars of iron:
whereas, all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the
west. Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity,
from doing, and even willing and choosing, as they please, with full freedom; yea, with the
highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the
heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make some persons believe
this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old
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prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot,
impossible, &c. the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with liberty,
is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long
bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former cavity again and again.
The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes, that if men had the truth concerning
the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves,
or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or account-
able for their actions: 169 which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any
of their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing
they do, by reason of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to
prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there shown, that
this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men’s actions which truly take place,
is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: that the
liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity,
is inconsistent with the being of these; as it would suppose that men are not determined in
what they do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions,
or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And is it not remarkable,
that this author should suppose, that, in order to men’s actions truly having any desert, they
must be performed without any view, purpose, design, or desire, or any principle of action,
or any thing agreeable to a rational nature? as it will appear that he does, if we compare, p.
206, 207, with p. 175.
The author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man’s nature a
strong and invincible apprehension, or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty, and contingence
of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth
169 P. 207, 209, and other places.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…