CHAP. VIII.
In what respects virtue or moral good is founded in sentiment; and how far it is founded
in the reason and nature of things.
Virtue is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality. That form or quality is called
beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely, or the view of which is immediately
pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable in itself, and immediately pleasant, to distinguish it
from things which in themselves are not so, but either indifferent or disagreeable; which yet
appear eligible, and agreeable indirectly, for something else with which they are connected.
Such indirect agreeableness, or eligibleness in things not for themselves, but for something
else, is not beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing, and delightful in itself,
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then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is beauty. It is
evident, that the way we come by the idea of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the
gratefulness of the idea called beautiful; and not by finding out by argumentation any con-
sequences, or other things with which it stands connected; any more than tasting the
sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connexions
and consequences. The manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beau-
tiful idea depends not on any reasonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find
out whether it be beautiful or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made,
that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.
Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm that virtue is founded in senti-
ment, and not in reason, that they who see the beauty of true virtue do not perceive it by
argumentation on its connexions and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds,
or a certain spiritual sense given them of God—whereby they immediately perceive pleasure
in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view
or contemplation of this object—this is certainly true. But if thereby be meant, that the frame
of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in
the idea of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a
contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the neces-
sary nature of things, this I think is not true.
Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of being to being in
general. And that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with view
of this, is benevolence, or union of heart, to being in general; or it is an universally benevolent
frame of mind. Because, he whose temper is to love being in general, must therein have a
disposition to approve and be pleased with love to being in general. Therefore, now the
question is, whether God, in giving this temper to a created mind, acts so arbitrarily, that
irrespective of their tendency to God, can with no more propriety be respected as virtues, than cohesion can be
termed gravitation.—W.
CHAPTER VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment.
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CHAPTER VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment.