Maker, and Creator,” he says. These names, though they seem to be three, include the sense
of but two concepts, since two of the words are equivalent in meaning. For to make is the
same as to create, but generation is another thing distinct from those spoken of. Now, seeing
that the result of the signification of the words is to divide the ordinary apprehension of
men into different ideas, what argument demonstrates to us that making is the same thing
with generation, to the end that we may accommodate the one essence to this difference of
terms? For so long as the ordinary significance of the words holds, and no argument is found
to transfer the sense of the terms to an opposite meaning, it is not possible that any one
nature should be divided between the conception of “product of making,” and that of
“product of generation.” Since each of these terms, used by itself, has a meaning of its own,
we must also suppose the relative conjunction in which they stand to be appropriate and
germane to the terms. For all other relative terms have their connection, not with what is
foreign and heterogeneous, but, even if the correlative term be suppressed, we hear spontan-
eously, together with the primary word, that which is linked with it, as in the case of “maker,”
“slave,” “friend,” “son,” and so forth. For all names that are considered as relative to another,
present to us, by the mention of them, each its proper and closely connected relationship
with that which it declares, while they avoid all mixture of that which is heterogeneous652.
For neither is the name of “maker” linked with the word “son,” nor the term “slave” referred
to the term “maker,” nor does “friend” present to us a “slave,” nor “son” a “master,” but we
recognize clearly and distinctly the connection of each of these with its correlative, conceiving
by the word “friend” another friend; by “slave,” a master; by “maker,” work; by “son,” a
father. In the same way, then, “product of generation” has its proper relative sense; with the
“product of generation,” surely, is linked the generator, and with the “product of creation”
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the creator; and we must certainly, if we are not prepared by a substitution of names to in-
troduce a confusion of things, preserve for each of the relative terms that which it properly
connotes.
Now, seeing that the tendency of the meaning of these words is manifest, how comes
it that one who advances his doctrine by the aid of logical system failed to perceive in these
names their proper relative sense? But he thinks that he is linking on the “product of gener-
ation” to “maker,” and the “product of making” to “generator,” by saying that the essence
of the Son “admits for itself the appellations of ‘product of generation,’ ‘product of making,’
and ‘product of creation,’” and “preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker,
and Creator.” For it is contrary to nature, that a single thing should be split up into different
652 E.g.“A thing made” suggests to us the thought of a “maker,” “a maker” the thought of the thing made;
and they suggest also a close connection as existing between the two correlative terms of one of which the name
is uttered; but neither suggests in the same way any term which is not correlative, or with which it is not, in
some manner, in pari materia.
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He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,”…