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Technische verwerking bevestigt geen inhoudelijke beoordeling of toestemming voor openbare publicatie.

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PHILOSOPHY must be apprehended as a member of the class, colours, but may be either red or green or blue, so either everything must be apprehended as a member of the class, known things, but may be known either to A or B or C. A tree is only known as an element of the indivisible unity which is expressed by the phrase" perception-of-a-tree." Only the words used in this phrase are separable ; their meanings are inseparable. But a perception of a tree may none the less exist independently of my apprehension of the " perception-of-a-tree." My apprehension of the per- ception-of-a-tree is not an indivisible unity, but contains parts which I apprehend as separable—my apprehension on the one hand and perception-of-a-tree on the other. But if we attempt to push analysis further and detach the tree per se from all per- ception of it, we find that " each of the divided members again resolves itself into both of the factors into which the original whole was separated ; and that in this way the distinction undoes itself, while the subjective and objective are thus restored to their original unity." 1 This form of idealism, it is worth noting, escapes the difficulties which beset some current exposi- tions of the Hegelian identification of thought and being. It does not refuse to make a distinction between the individual mind and what it knows. On Ferrier's view, when I apprehend the " perception of a tree," the perception-of-a-tree does not pro tanto become part of my existence ; only the apprehension of it becomes part of my existence. Thus, in spite of his con- tinual polemic against what he is pleased to call Psychology, he has really provided a field for the psychologist. Here, however, a question arises to which we find no approach to a satisfactory answer in Ferrier's writings. In what way, we may ask, does the individual mind apprehend objective perceptions ? So far as Ferrier suggests any answer at all, it is indicated by his use of the word " participation." Thus, in 1 Works, vol. ii. p. 299. L 163

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