PHILOSOPHY
must be apprehended as a member of the class, colours, but may
be either red or green or blue, so either everything must be
apprehended as a member of the class, known things, but may
be known either to A or B or C. A tree is only known as an
element of the indivisible unity which is expressed by the phrase"
perception-of-a-tree." Only the words used in this phrase are
separable ; their meanings are inseparable. But a perception of
a tree may none the less exist independently of my apprehension
of the " perception-of-a-tree." My apprehension of the per-
ception-of-a-tree is not an indivisible unity, but contains parts
which I apprehend as separable—my apprehension on the one
hand and perception-of-a-tree on the other. But if we attempt
to push analysis further and detach the tree per se from all per-
ception of it, we find that " each of the divided members again
resolves itself into both of the factors into which the original
whole was separated ; and that in this way the distinction
undoes itself, while the subjective and objective are thus restored
to their original unity."
1
This form of idealism, it is worth
noting, escapes the difficulties which beset some current exposi-
tions of the Hegelian identification of thought and being. It
does not refuse to make a distinction between the individual
mind and what it knows. On Ferrier's view, when I apprehend
the " perception of a tree," the perception-of-a-tree does not
pro tanto become part of my existence ; only the apprehension
of it becomes part of my existence. Thus, in spite of his con-
tinual polemic against what he is pleased to call Psychology,
he has really provided a field for the psychologist.
Here, however, a question arises to which we find no
approach to a satisfactory answer in Ferrier's writings. In what
way, we may ask, does the individual mind apprehend objective
perceptions ? So far as Ferrier suggests any answer at all, it is
indicated by his use of the word " participation." Thus, in
1
Works, vol. ii. p. 299.
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