city, yet their community of entrance does not bind them together; for even when they are
within they can be separated to join their own kindred); something of the same kind I seem
to discern in the spacious territory of our mind; for often the knowledge which we gather
from the different organs of sense is one, as the same object is divided into several parts in
relation to the senses; and again, on the contrary, we may learn from some one sense many
and varied things which have no affinity one with another.
6. For instance—for it is better to make our argument clear by illustration—let us suppose
that we are making some inquiry into the property of tastes—what is sweet to the sense, and
what is to be avoided by tasters. We find, then, by experience, both the bitterness of gall and
the pleasant character of the quality of honey; but when these facts are known, the knowledge
is one which is given to us (the same thing being introduced to our understanding in several
ways) by taste, smell, hearing, and often by touch and sight. For when one sees honey, and
hears its name, and receives it by taste, and recognizes its odour by smell, and tests it by
touch, he recognizes the same thing by means of each of his senses.
7. On the other hand we get varied and multiform information by some one sense, for
as hearing receives all sorts of sounds, and our visual perception exercises its operation by
beholding things of different kinds—for it lights alike on black and white, and all things
that are distinguished by contrariety of colour,—so with taste, with smell, with perception
by touch; each implants in us by means of its own perceptive power the knowledge of things
of every kind.
733
That the mind works by means of the senses.