grees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency, considered with all their
nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the strongest Motives, and those that
have least, are the weakest Motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is strongest, or has most
previous tendency or advantage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the
weakest, or that which, as it stands previously in the mind’s view, has least tendency to induce
it; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason to
dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the
Will must proceed without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the
weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in the Motive,
to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the same time to suppose, that there is nothing
in the Motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstance of it whatsoever, as it stands in the
previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference: but on the contrary, the other Motive
that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it that is inviting
and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as much
as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive for the act of preference, and
yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives,
which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which is preferred,
but wholly in the other: and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference is from
previous ground and reason, in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent?
Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous
tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another, without any previous tendency to
its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of pre-
vious reason why it should follow.
Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an antecedent, as the
ground of its existence, which has not only no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The
event is the preference, which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands
in the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the
two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness, or
previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary
Motive; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative
neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: and yet in this view of the mind
is supposed to be the previous ground or reason of this act of preference, exciting it, and
disposing the mind to it. Which I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it
be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a con-
sequent, is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow; and the want of a
previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason
why that event does follow.
587
SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…