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origineel ID: pg45305-paragraph-489 · verwerkingsstatus: Verwerkt, inhoudelijk nog niet beoordeeld · teksthash: d287fd124e8b16e750b532d8c38afdccd2f9568dd50d03de646d87f284ed9ab3 · 3,157 tekens

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I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own words the opinions which Varro expresses in his book. But how he refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one, the Old Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth teacher of that school of philosophy which held that their system was certain; and how on this ground he distinguishes it from the New Academy, which began with Polemo's successor Arcesilaus, and held that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the Old Academy was as free from error as from doubt,—all this, I say, were too long to enter upon in detail, and yet I must not altogether pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all those differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the ground on which he does so is that they are not differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme good. Thus, when it is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social life, and desire and be interested in the supreme good of his friend as in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely for his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but only about the propriety of associating or not associating a friend in its participation: whether the wise man will do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights as in his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which philosophy is concerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New Academy, or certain, as the other philosophers maintain, the question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether or not we are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it more plainly, whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain that it is a true good, or only that it appears to him to be true, though possibly it may be delusive,—both pursuing one and the same good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and manners of the Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good, but only the question whether he who pursues that good which seems to himself true should live as do the Cynics. There were, in fact, men who, though they pursued different things as the supreme good, some choosing pleasure, others virtue, yet adopted that mode of life which gave the Cynics their name. Thus, whatever it is which distinguishes the Cynics from other philosophers, this has no bearing on the choice and pursuit of that good which constitutes happiness. For if it had any such bearing, then the same habits of life would necessitate the pursuit of the same chief good, and diverse habits would necessitate the pursuit of different ends.

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Versie d4327b966f583f4f47cacdaabe0618ea62abf5b244c0bca01dc5b4e97bc9f795
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Varro then rejects, as a first step, all\r\nthose differences which have multiplied the number of sects;\r\nand the ground on which he does so is that they are not differences\r\nabout the supreme good. He maintains that in\r\nphilosophy a sect is created only by its having an opinion of\r\nits own different from other schools on the point of the ends-in-chief.\r\nFor man has no other reason for philosophizing\r\nthan that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy\r\nis itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good\r\nis the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be\r\ncalled a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own\r\ntowards the supreme good. 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