Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty
years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or some
particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a
particular nature and form; all in absolute Contingence, without any concern of God, or any
other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any
dependence upon, or connexion at all with any thing foregoing: I say, that if this be supposed,
there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in
the thing itself; for the thing itself, as yet, was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen
in any thing else; for evidence in something else, is connexion with something else: but such
connexion is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this thing
would happen; for by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than
something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before were exactly equal,
and the same, with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation,
no superior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of weight or value to de-
termine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely un-
knowable. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency,
and makes no advance, towards discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased
never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may
have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and
deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence
where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely
great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease; yet it has no
tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not; but on the contrary,
it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.
III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which
is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and
yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God’s
knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all
conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so
contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself;
or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows. It is the
same as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows
to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all Necessity, that
nothing hinders but it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future existence,
is so uncertain, that nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God
knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent
with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing
that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contin-
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…