or about the mind’s view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, “in
or about the mind’s view of’ the object;” because what has influence to render an object in
view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the
view and the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all
things pertaining to the mind’s view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their
appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require
a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention
some things in general.
I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature
7
and circumstances of the object. And there are various things of this sort, that have influence
in rendering the object more or less agreeable; as,
1. That which appears in the object, rendering it beautiful and pleasant, or deformed
and irksome to the mind; viewing it as it is in itself.
2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the consequence
of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed as circumstances of the object, are
to be considered as belonging to it; and as it were parts of it, as it stands in the mind’s view
a proposed object of choice.
3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect to distance of
time; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have
pleasure speedily; and disagreeable, to have it delayed: so that if there be two equal degrees
of pleasure set in the mind’s view, and all other things are equal, but one is beheld as near,
and the other afar off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because,
though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not as
viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the additional agreeableness of the cir-
cumstance of nearness.
II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands
in the mind’s view, is the manner of view. If the object be something which appears connected
with future pleasure, not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also
the manner of the view, especially in two respects.
1. With respect to the degree of assent, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be
future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain happiness, than an uncertain one; and
a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the
mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.
2. With respect to the degree of the idea or apprehension of the future pleasure. With
regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we
have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is
much more clear, lively, and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate
sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by
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SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.