Chapter III.
The systematic discussion of syllables is derived from heathen philosophy.
5. They have, however, been led into this error by their close study of heathen writers,
who have respectively applied the terms “of whom” and “through whom” to things which
are by nature distinct. These writers suppose that by the term “of whom” or “of which” the
matter is indicated, while the term “through whom” or “through which”719 represents the
instrument, or, generally speaking, subordinate agency.720 Or rather—for there seems no
reason why we should not take up their whole argument, and briefly expose at once its in-
compatibility with the truth and its inconsistency with their own teaching—the students of
vain philosophy, while expounding the manifold nature of cause and distinguishing its pe-
culiar significations, define some causes as principal,721 some as cooperative or con-causal,
while others are of the character of “sine qua non,” or indispensable.722
For every one of these they have a distinct and peculiar use of terms, so that the maker
is indicated in a different way from the instrument. For the maker they think the proper
expression is “by whom,” maintaining that the bench is produced “by” the carpenter; and
for the instrument “through which,” in that it is produced “through” or by means of adze
and gimlet and the rest. Similarly they appropriate “of which” to the material, in that the
thing made is “of” wood, while “according to which” shews the design, or pattern put before
the craftsman. For he either first makes a mental sketch, and so brings his fancy to bear
upon what he is about, or else he looks at a pattern previously put before him, and arranges
his work accordingly. The phrase “on account of which” they wish to be confined to the
end or purpose, the bench, as they say, being produced for, or on account of, the use of
719 The ambiguity of gender in ἐξ οὗ and δι᾽ οὗ can only be expressed by giving the alternatives in English.
720 There are four causes or varieties of cause: 1. The essence or quiddity (Form): τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. 2. The
necessitating conditions (Matter): τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι. 3. The proximate mover or stimulator
of change (Efficient): ἡ τί πρῶτον ἐκίνησε. 4. That for the sake of which (Final Cause or End): τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα.
Grote’s Aristotle, I. 354. The four Aristotelian causes are thus: 1. Formal. 2. Material. 3. Efficient. 4. Final. cf.
Arist. Analyt. Post. II. xi., Metaph. I. iii., and Phys. II. iii. The six causes of Basil may be referred to the four of
Aristotle as follows: Aristotle. 1. τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι 2. τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι 3. ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη 4. τὸ
οὗ ἕνεκα Basil. 1. καθ᾽ ὅ: i.e., the form or idea according to which a thing is made. 2. ἐξ οὗ: i.e., the matter out
of which it is made. 3. ὑφ᾽ οὗ: i.e., the agent, using means. δι᾽ οὗ: i.e. the means. 4. δι᾽ ὅ: i.e., the end. εν ᾧ, or
sine quâ non, applying to all.
721 προκαταρκτική. cf. Plut. 2, 1056. B.D. προκαταρκτικὴ αἰτία ἡ εἱμαρμένη.
722 cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. viii. 9. “Of causes some are principal, some preservative, some coöperative, some
indispensable; e.g. of education the principal cause is the father; the preservative, the schoolmaster; the coöper-
ative, the disposition of the pupil; the indispensable, time.”
The systematic discussion of syllables is derived from heathen philosophy.
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The systematic discussion of syllables is derived from heathen philosop…