nor fearing to entertain hatred of evil in the case of those who live with him and who prosecute the injured, nor dreading danger at the hands of those who do wrong, remains righteous. For he who, on account of these considerations, abstains from anything wrong, is not voluntarily kind, but is good from fear. Even Epicurus says, that the man who in his estimation was wise, “would not do wrong to any one for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection.” So that, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, according to him, do evil. And such are the doctrines of darkness. If, too, one shall abstain from doing wrong from hope of the recompense given by God on account of righteous deeds, he is not on this supposition spontaneously good. For as fear makes that man just, so reward makes this one; or rather, makes him appear to be just. But with the hope after death—a good hope to the good, to the bad the reverse—not only they who follow after Barbarian wisdom, but also the Pythagoreans, are acquainted. For the latter also proposed hope as an end to those who philosophize. Whereas Socrates also, in the Phædo, says “that good souls depart hence with a good hope;” and again, denouncing the wicked, he sets against this the assertion, “For they live with an evil hope.” With him Heraclitus manifestly agrees in his dissertations concerning men: “There awaits man after death what they neither hope nor think.” Divinely, therefore, Paul writes expressly, “Tribulation worketh, patience, and patience experience, and experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed.” For the patience is on account of the hope in the future. Now hope is synonymous with the recompense and restitution of hope; which maketh not ashamed, not being any more vilified.