those arguments which are brought to prove that the apostle meant the ceremonial law, are
nothing to the purpose, unless they prove that the apostle meant those only.
What is much insisted on is, that it was the judaizing Christians being so fond of circum-
cision, and other ceremonies of the law, and depending so much on them, which was the
very occasion of the apostle’s writing as he does against justification by the works of the law.
But supposing it were so, that their trusting in works of the ceremonial law were the sole
occasion of the apostle’s writing, (which yet there is no reason to allow, as may appear after-
wards,) if their trusting in a particular work, as a work of righteousness, was all that gave
occasion to the apostle to write, how does it follow, that therefore the apostle did not upon
that occasion write against trusting in all works of righteousness whatsoever? Where is the
absurdity of supposing that the apostle might take occasion, from his observing some to
trust in a certain work as a work of righteousness, to write to them against persons trusting
in any works or righteousness at all, and that it was a very proper occasion too? Yea, it would
have been unavoidable for the apostle to have argued against trusting in a particular work,
in the quality of a work of righteousness, which quality was general, but he must therein
argue against trusting in works of righteousness in general. Supposing it had been some
other particular sort of works that was the occasion of the apostle’s writing, as for instance,
works of charity, and the apostle should hence take occasion to write to them not to trust
in their works, could the apostle by that be understood of no other works besides works of
charity? Would it have been absurd to understand him as writing against trusting in any
work at all, because it was their trusting to a particular work that gave occasion to his writing?
Another thing alleged, as an evidence that the apostle means the ceremonial law—when
he says, we cannot be justified by the works of the law—is, that he uses this argument to
prove it, viz. that the law he speaks of was given so long after the covenant with Abraham,
in Gal. iii. 17. “And this I say, that the covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ,
the law which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul.” But, say they, it
was only the Mosaic administration, and not the covenant of works, that was given so long
after. But the apostle’s argument seems manifestly to be mistaken by them. The apostle does
not speak of a law that began to exist four hundred and thirty years after; if he did, there
would be some force in their objection; but he has respect to a certain solemn transaction,
well known among the Jews by the phrase “the giving of the law,” which was at mount Sinai,
(Exod. xix. xx.) consisting especially in God’s giving the ten commandments (which is the
moral law) with a terrible voice, which law he afterwards gave in tables of stone. This
transaction the Jews in the apostle’s time misinterpreted; they looked upon it as God’s estab-
lishing that law as a rule of justification. Against this conceit of theirs the apostle brings this
invincible argument, viz. that God would never go about to disannul his covenant with
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DISCOURSE. II. Pressing into the Kingdom of God.