perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so, to state all things according to the most
perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may
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therefore be sure it is and will be done.
I should think that these things might incline us to suppose, that God has not forgot
himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated
these ends, (however self-sufficient, immutable, and independent,) as therein plainly to
show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus,
must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.
5. Whatsoever is good, amiable, and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, (which
facts and events show that God aimed at in the creation of the world,) must be supposed to
be regarded or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must
suppose, from the perfection of God’s nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in
itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; because God’s judgment
and esteem are according to truth. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely on its
own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value. For to suppose that he values it only
for some farther end, is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he
values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values
for itself, appears, in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must
regard it as an ultimate end. And, therefore, if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part
of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now
proceed a step farther, and assert,
6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect of the creation of the world, which is simply
and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God’s creating the world.
We see that it is a good which God aimed at by the creation of the world; because he has
actually attained it by that means. For we may justly infer what God intends, by what he
actually does; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever God
intends to attain, from a value for it, in his actions and works, that he seeks in those acts and
works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by the means he uses,
is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his
end in those means. Now, it being, by the supposition, what God values ultimately, it must
therefore, by the preceding position, be aimed at by God, as an ultimate end of creating the
world.
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SECTION I. The general dictates of reason.