cluded in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in
it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt
he had double, as for two distinct sins: one, the wickedness of his will in that affair; another,
the wickedness of the external act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of his
inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than the motions of
any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient for, and
entirely amounting to, all that appeared in the act he committed.
The depraved disposition of Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1.) As the first
rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the
complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed
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principle that came by God’s forsaking of him; which was a punishment of his first trans-
gression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought
additional guilt on his soul.
In like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s posterity.
The first listing of a corrupt disposition, is not to be looked upon as sin distinct from their
participation of Adam’s first sin. It is as it were the extended pollution of that sin, through
the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root; or the inher-
ence of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence
with the head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an established principle
in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a consequence and punishment
of the first apostacy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil dispos-
ition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far
as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a
consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam’s
own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather
prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation or the evil disposition to Adam’s
posterity, or rather, the co-existence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam’s first rebellion,
in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world
has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the im-
putation of his sin; nay, is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity
of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union;
but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as
it was in the case of Adam himself. 144
144 My meaning, in the whole of what has been said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose that Adam and
all his posterity had co-existed, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature established by the Cre-
ator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to
the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by the law of union there
should have been a communion and co-existence in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring,
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CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.