of the Son to the Father, and proceeds by his definition to establish the position that we
ought not to conceive of Him as being like. For by saying, “He is not like as Father to Father,”
he makes out that He is not like; and again when he adds, “nor as Ungenerate to Ungenerate,”
by this phrase, too, he forbids us to conceive a likeness in the Son to the Father; and finally,
by subjoining “nor as Son to Son,” he introduces a third conception, by which he entirely
subverts the meaning of “like.” So it is that he follows up his own statements, and conducts
his demonstration of likeness by establishing unlikeness. And now let us examine the dis-
cernment and frankness which he displays in these distinctions. After saying that the Son
is like the Father, he guards the statement by adding that we ought not to think that the Son
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is like the Father, “as Father to Father.” Why, what man on earth is such a fool as, on
learning that the Son is like the Father, to be brought by any course of reasoning to think
of the likeness of Father to Father? “Nor as Son to Son”:—here, again, the acuteness of the
distinction is equally conspicuous. When he tells us that the Son is like the Father, he adds
the further definition that He must not be understood to be like Him in the same way as
He would be like another Son. These are the mysteries of the awful doctrines of Eunomius,
by which his disciples are made wiser than the rest of the world, by learning that the Son,
by His likeness to the Father, is not like a Son, for the Son is not the Father: nor is He like
“as Ungenerate to Ungenerate,” for the Son is not ungenerate. But the mystery which we
have received, when it speaks of the Father, certainly bids us understand the Father of the
Son, and when it names the Son, teaches us to apprehend the Son of the Father. And until
the present time we never felt the need of these philosophic refinements, that by the words
Father and Son are suggested two Fathers or two Sons, a pair, so to say, of ungenerate beings.
Now the drift of Eunomius’ excessive concern about the Ungenerate has been often
explained before; and it shall here be briefly discovered yet again. For as the term Father
points to no difference of nature from the Son, his impiety, if he had brought his statement
to a close here, would have had no support, seeing that the natural sense of the names
Father and Son excludes the idea of their being alien in essence. But as it is, by employing
the terms “generate” and “ungenerate,” since the contradictory opposition between them
admits of no mean, just like that between “mortal” and “immortal,” “rational” and “irration-
al,” and all those terms which are opposed to each other by the mutually exclusive nature
of their meaning,—by the use of these terms, I repeat, he gives free course to his profanity,
so as to contemplate as existing in the “generate” with reference to the “ungenerate” the
same difference which there is between “mortal” and “immortal”: and even as the nature of
the mortal is one, and that of the immortal another, and as the special attributes of the ra-
tional and of the irrational are essentially incompatible, just so he wants to make out that
the nature of the ungenerate is one, and that of the generate another, in order to show that
as the irrational nature has been created in subjection to the rational, so the generate is by
a necessity of its being in a state of subordination to the ungenerate. For which reason he
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He thus proceeds to a magnificent discourse of the interpretation of “Mediator,”…