try to prevent or remove their existence: but such opposition of ours always either consists
in, or implies, opposition of our wills.
It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are understood in
this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will.
So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought
to pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires
and endeavors are, or would be, vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which overcomes
all our opposition, resistance, and endeavor to the contrary. And we are said to be unable
to do a thing when our supposable desires and endeavors are insufficient.
We are accustomed, in the common use of language, thus to apply and understand these
phrases: we grow up with such a habit; which, by the daily use of these terms from our
childhood, becomes fixed and settled; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire,
and endeavor of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, whenever we hear the words
used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated, that they unavoidably go together; one
suggests the other, and never can be easily separated as long as we live. And though we use
the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceedingly circumspect, we
shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent
manner, which will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, even when
we pretend to use them as terms of art.
4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms necessary, impossible,
irresistible, unable, &c. are used in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be
supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or
endeavor; they are then not used in their proper signification. The reason is manifest; in
such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition, will, or en-
deavor. And therefore if any man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them non-
sensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper meaning. As for
instance; if any one should affirm after this manner, That it is necessary for a man, or what
must be, that he should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue
to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that
he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues; such a one would use the terms
must, irresistible, &c. with either perfect insignificance, or in some new sense, diverse from
their common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition,
unwillingness, and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any
such thing: for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing.
5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms necessary, impossible, &c. are
often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common
and original signification; for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is
supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God’s existence before the creation of the
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SECTION III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility,…