What is this putting and tying things together, which is done in abstraction? It is not
merely a tying of them under the same name; for I do believe, that deaf and dumb persons
abstract and distribute things into kinds. But it is so putting of them together, that the mind
resolves hereafter to think of them together, under a common notion, as if they were a col-
lective substance; the mind being as sure, in this proceeding, of reasoning well, as if it were
of a particular substance; for it has abstracted that which belongs alike to all, and has a perfect
idea, whose relations and properties it can behold, as well as those of the idea of one indi-
vidual. Although this ranking of things be arbitrary, yet there is much more foundation for
some distributions than others. Some are much more useful, and much better serve the
purposes of abstraction.
[24.] There is really a difference that the mind makes, in the consideration of an Univer-
sal, absolutely considered, and a Species. There is a difference in the two ideas, when we say
Man, including simply the abstract idea; and when we say, the Human Sort of Living Creature.
There is reference had to an idea more abstract. And there is this act of the mind in distrib-
uting an Universal into Species. It ties this abstract idea to two or more less abstract ideas,
and supposes it limited by them.
It is not every property that belongs to all the particulars included in, and proper to, a
Genus, and that men generally see to be so, that is a part of that complex abstract idea, that
represents all the particulars, or that is a part of that nominal essence. But so much is essential,
which, if men should see any thing less, they would not call it by the name, by which they
call the Genus. This indeed is uncertain, because men never agreed upon fixing exact bounds.
[25.] A part, is one of those many ideas, which we are wont to think of together. A whole,
is an idea containing many of these.
[47.] the foundation of the most considerable Species or Sorts, in which things are
ranked, is the order of the world—the designed distribution of God and nature. When we,
in distributing things, differ from that design, we don’t know the true essences of things. If
the world had been created without any order, or design, or beauty, indeed, all species would
be merely arbitrary. There are certain multitudes of things, that God has made to agree,
very remarkably in something, either as to their outward appearance, manner of acting, the
effects they produce, or that other things produce on them, the manner of their production,
or God’s disposal concerning them, or some peculiar perpetual circumstances that they are
in. Thus diamonds agree in shape; pieces of gold, in that they will be divided in aqua regia;
loadstones, in innumerable strange effects that they produce; many plants, in the peculiar
effects they produce on animal bodies; men, in that they are to remain after this life. That
inward conformation, that is the foundation of an agreement in these things, is the real es-
sence of the thing. For instance, that disposition of parts, or whatever it be, in the matter of
the loadstone, from whence arises the verticity to the poles, and its influence on other
loadstones and iron, is the real essence of the loadstone that is unknown to us.
484
NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.