reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself. Present choice cannot at present choose
to be otherwise: for that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at
present chosen. If the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that way,
then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose
to be made to go the other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change
itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than
it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future remote act that it is exposed to, but
not its own present act.
2. As it is impossible that the Will should comply with the thing commanded, with respect
to its leading act, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite leading and
original act, or after it has actually come under the influence of that determining choice or
inclination; so it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing
act; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act; the opposite or noncomplying
act being that act which is original and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so, that
if this first determining act be found non-complying, on the proposal of the command, the
mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be
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able to determine and cause its first determining act to be otherwise, and that it has power
better to govern and regulate its first governing and regulating act, which is absurd; for it is
to suppose a prior act of the Will, determining its first determining act; that is, an act prior
to the first, and leading and governing the original and governing act of all; which is a con-
tradiction.
Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to
what it does will, in the original and leading act of the Will, because there is supposed to be
no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the Will cannot immediately change
itself, because it cannot at present incline to a change; yet the mind has an ability for the
present to forbear to proceed to action, and taking time for deliberation; which may be an
occasion of the change of the inclination.
I answer, (1.) In this objection, that seems to be forgotten which was observed before,
viz. that the determining to take the matter into consideration, is itself an act of the Will:
and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the
supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by precept. And if this act be
the commanding act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of
the Will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are
speaking concerning the first and leading act of the Will about the affair; and if determining
to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first
and leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines
that; or whatever be the original and leading act; still the foregoing proof stands good, that
the non-compliance of the leading act implies moral Inability to comply.
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…