228 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK IX.
substance ; but he that loves and love, or he that knows and
knowledge, are spoken of relatively to each other, as are
friends : but mind or spirit are not relatives, as neither are
men relatives ; yet he that loves and love, or he that knows
and knowledge, cannot exist separately from each other, as
men can that are friends. Although it would seem that
friends, too, can be separated in body, not in mind, in as far as
they are friends : nay, it can even happen that a friend may
even also begin to hate a friend, and on this account cease to
be a friend, while the other does not know it, and still loves
him. But if the love with which the mind loves itself ceases
to be, then the mind also will at the same time cease to love.
Likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself
ceases to be, then the mind will also at the same time cease to
know itself. Just as the head of anything that has a head is cer-
tainly a head, and they are predicated relatively to each other,
although they are also substances : for both a head is a body,
and so is that which has a head ; and if there be no head, then
neither will there be that which has a head. Only these things
can be separated from each other by cutting off, those cannot.
7. And even if there are some bodies which cannot be
wholly separated and divided, yet they would not be bodies
unless they consisted of their own proper parts. A part then
is predicated relatively to a whole, since every part is a part
of some, whole, and a whole is a whole by having all its parts.
But since both part and whole are bodies, these things are not
only predicated relatively, but exist also substantially. Per-
haps, then, the mind is a whole, and the love with which it
loves itself, and the knowledge with which it knows itself, are
as if its parts, of which two parts that whole consists. Or
are there three equal parts which make up the one whole ?
But no part embraces the whole, of which it is a part; whereas,
when the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself
perfectly, then the knowledge of it extends through the whole
of it ; and when it loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as
a whole, and the love of it extends through the whole of it.
Is it, then, as one drink is made from wine and water and
honey, and each single part extends through the whole, and
yet they are three things (for there is no part of the drink