benevolent influence; and when moral agents are its object, (their being and natural capacities, or their moral
capabilities, being supposed,) the exercise of absolute equity must necessarily exclude benevolent, sovereign
influence. Thus among men we find some resemblance of this abstract but momentous truth. In one view, justice
and generosity are compatible; for strict, absolute justice, is the same as justice and nothing more, and therefore
must exclude generosity. 10. Therefore, equity, in the one view, implies the exclusion of injustice; and in the
other, the exclusion of undeserved favour, or sovereign benevolent influence. The exercise of rectitude in the
former sense, might have been without the permission of sin; but not so in the latter sense. If perfect absolute
rectitude towards a moral system, be made to emanate ad extra, to the full development of the capabilities of
such a system, the permission of sin is not only equitable, but even metaphysically necessary. That is, it involves
a contradiction to say, that such a divine perfection may be so displayed, or its glory made to appear ad extra,
and yet not to permit the existence of moral defect, or, in other words, to actually hinder its existence. 11. The
very idea of a moral system, in which the permission of defect is excluded by equity, is one of the most absurd
that can be conceived. For it is the same as to say that God was bound in equity not to permit sin, while at the
same time he constituted the agent free, and accountable for the exercise of his freedom; and as he has in fact
permitted the introduction of sin into the world, such an idea would be the same as to charge infinite perfection
with want of equity. 12. We may therefore safely conclude, that the glory of the divine rectitude, towards the
intelligent and moral part of the universe, could not be manifested without the permission of sin. The full exercise
of equity must necessarily leave the moral system to its own tendencies and operations. 13. To permit the event
of sin, or not to hinder it, implies, that the cause of defection is not in the permitter, but in the permitted; not
in the governor, but the governed. There is in the moral part of the universe a cause, why an event which ought
not to take place, will take place, if not hindered. If there be no such cause in the system, how could the event
take place on permission? If it be said, There is a chance it may not take place, and there is a chance of the contrary
— it is but fair to ask, Is this chance something which has a cause, or has it no cause? If the latter, the concession
itself reduces chance to a mere nothing. For a contingent event, as the operation of chance is supposed to be,
without any cause, is a metaphysical impossibility. If the former; what is the cause of what the objector calls
chance? Is it something external, or internal? What is its nature and character? To say that liberty of indifference
or a self-determining power, is the chance which requires no preceding cause to produce the event, is to contradict
absolute demonstration, if ever there was a metaphysical demonstration of any subject: as our author has
abundantly shown in his “Essay on the Freedom of the Will.” 14. It is therefore inaccurate and unintelligible
language to say, that either chance, liberty or indifference, or a self-determining power, independent of any
antecedent cause, is adequate to account for the event of sin, or a deterioration of a moral system. God, therefore,
permitting, there is an inherent adequate cause of failure, distinct from divine causation. What this cause is, and
what is its nature, has been shown and proved in a former note. 15. Permission is an act of equity; or, it is the
exercise of rectitude, to the exclusion of benevolent influence; whether we regard that influence as preventing
the event of sin, or as delivering from its power. Sovereign benevolence prevents the fall of angels; and it delivers,
restores, and eternally saves a goodly number of the human fallen race. Without the permission of sin, restoring
benevolence, or the exercise of mercy, would have been impossible; and consequently, the glory of that perfection,
which can be fully displayed only by its exercise towards the miserable, which would have be eternally concealed.
16. If, therefore, equity be a glorious attribute of God, its emanation and exercise must be glorious. But the ex-
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SECTION VII. God's last end is but one.