is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of Scripture, and the nature of
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things, includes all moral rectitude; which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it true and
genuine, be resolved into this single principle.” If it be so indeed, then certainly no act
whatsoever can have moral rectitude, but what proceeds from this principle. And consequently
no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle
exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection, and choice must go
before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This
brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be virtuous but what
proceeds from a principle of benevolence, or love; for he insists that all genuine moral
rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle. And yet the principle of
benevolence itself cannot be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice; for he affirms, that
nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love as
the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of
it; and yet virtuous choice must go before virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that.
If a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this
virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect. So
that here is at least one part of virtue, yea the spring and source of all virtue, viz. a virtuous
choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of love.
Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. T. (p. 128.) says, the cause of every effect
is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth or which proceedeth from it, and so he argues,
that if the effect be bad, the cause alone is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the
effect is good, the cause alone is righteous or virtuous. To the cause is to be ascribed all the
praise of the good effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as
Dr. Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be
essential to the nature of righteousness, or moral rectitude, that it be the effect of choice,
and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from
choice; then not the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice
alone is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of
all moral rectitude, in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence,
no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle; but all is to be re-
solved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.
But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that there is no moral rectitude or
virtue in that first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two
ways; 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is the effect; and
therefore no part of it can lie in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least,
can have no virtue or righteousness at all; because it does not proceed from any foregoing
choice. For Dr. T. insists, that a man must first have reflection and choice, before he can
have righteousness; and that it is essential to holiness that it proceed from choice. So that
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SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.