not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, if by this be meant any thing actually existing, as coeval with
a good principle. Good is a principle positively eternal; but what we speak of is a mere negative principle, and
owes its existence as a property to a created nature; and were every creature annihilated, this property would
also cease to be. 13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or predisposing cause of vice? Shall we call
it defectibility, defect, limitation, or imperfection of existence? Not the first; for the question would return, What
makes a creature defectible? Not the second; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several kinds of defect,
natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use, and of frequent occurrence, it would require
perpetual explanations. Not the third, or the fourth; for the same reason. A term therefore not ambiguous, and
sufficiently expressive, should be employed; as we employ technical terms to express a specific object. For this
purpose, no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable, or more suitable, than passive power; for it is free from ambi-
guity, and is sufficiently expressive of the idea already explained. The idea of passivity is clearly implied in the
name, as in the thing; and the term power seems preferable to property, or quality, because less ambiguous, and
yet more expressive to convey the intended idea of metaphysical influence of cause and effect. 14. To which we
may add, That “passive power” is by no means a new coined expression; but has often been used to express the
very idea to which it is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that eminently pious and profoundly
learned divine, Theophilus Gale, in his “Court of the Gentiles,” says: “The root and origin of all creatural depend-
ence, is the creature’s passive power, and God’s absolute dominion over it. - Now all limits as to nature and essence
speak a mixture of nihility, passive power and dependence resulting therefrom; whence Damascene adds, ‘The
Deity only is impassible;’ namely, because exempt form nihility, passive power, and dependence. This nihility
or nothingness of the creature is the same with its passive power either physic or metaphysic, natural or obedi-
ential; whereby it is limited, and confined to such or such a degree of entity, existence, and operation.” (Court
of Gent. Part IV. B. ii. Ch. xi. 4.) 15. Now that the essence of vice consisteth not in this property is plain, in that
passive power is essential to a creature, which vice neither is nor can be. It is the soul in which vice grows, and
without which it could not grow, or have existence, but is not itself vicious; otherwise we should be forced to
seek the cause of that cause in perpetual retrogradation, and move from one difficulty to another into endless
absurdity. The predisposing cause of vice, therefore, is passive power which in itself is not vicious, or morally
evil. But how moral evil came to exist, and what is its true origin, will be more conveniently considered in a
subsequent part of this work. 16. As the essence of the virtue and vice of disposition and acts lies not in their
cause, so neither does it lie in their effects; that is, dispositions and acts are not to be denominated virtuous or
vicious on account of their effects or consequences, such as their being productive of happiness or misery. For
as the properties of any thing must be different from those of its cause, however similar, so must those properties
differ from their effects. The immediate effect of virtue is—not happiness to the individual, for instance, but—that
the agent is approvable or praiseworthy. But were the essence of virtue to consist in “its tendency to ultimate
happiness,” as some have affirmed, immediate approbation and praise could not be safely given to any individual
act or disposition, as its relation to ultimate happiness could not be ascertained but by the final event. If the essence
of the virtue or vice were not in the act or disposition, but to be denominated from its effects, many other ab-
surdities would follow. For instance, 17. That supposition, the supreme excellence of Jehovah would not be ap-
provable and praiseworthy on its own account, or its intrinsic excellency, but only because of its effects and
consequences. On that principle, to hate God would be nothing bad, it would have no intrinsic demerit; or to
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…