SECT. I.
The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the Will, lies not
in their Cause, but their Nature. 136
136 This may appear to some to be an identical proposition “The essence of a thing lies in its nature;” but it
is not wholly so, and the whole of the proposition is exceedingly important, on account of the negative part, or
the incidental proposition it contains, viz. The essence of virtue and vice lies not in their cause. A single consid-
eration may be sufficient to show the truth and importance of one part of this last proposition. If the essence of
virtue lay in its cause, how could the first cause, or the uncaused nature, be virtuous? If therefore the first cause
be virtuous, or have the essence of virtue, as all atheists will allow, it is plain that essence must lie in the nature
of that cause itself. Hence, as God is the standard of all moral excellence, created natures are morally excellent
in proportion as they resemble him. And as virtue is an imitable excellence, and as good reason can be assigned
why the resemblance should not hold in this particular, it is highly probably, a priori, that, in reference to created
natures, the essence of their virtue lies not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design of the present
section. Again, as the essence of virtue lies not in its cause, so neither does the essence of vice lie in its cause.
But the philosophical ground of this part of the general proposition demands more particular attention. And
as this proposition—“the essence of vice lies not in its cause,” affects the whole system of morals, and indeed of
theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks which, it is hoped, will cast some light on the subject. 1.
Causes are of two kinds, and of two only, either positive or negative. Positive causes produce positive effects,
from the first cause through all secondary causes: and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so
may decretive antecedents, which act physically and their consequences follow from the nature of things; even
as number follows the repetition of units, or happiness results from true virtue. 2. The term “cause” is applied
less properly to express a negative idea; for it expresses merely an antecedent of a consequent. For instance, if
we say that a man cannot read because he is blind, or cannot walk because he has no legs, or cannot go to
heaven because he does not love God, and the like; it is manifest that blindness, want of legs, and want of love
to God, are “causes” only as antecedents are causes to their consequents, without positive influence. 3. Negative
causes, though they have no positive operations in producing their consequents, are no less the ground of certainty
than those causes, properly so called, which exist in physical operations. For the consequent follows the antecedent
with equal certainty, whether the connexion be formed by decretive will and energy, as in all positive causes, or
by the nature of things only, which is essential truth, as in all negative causes. 4. The cause of vicious acts, is a
vicious disposition; in other words, it is the want, or the absence of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the
vicious act, however, is not in the cause, or disposition. The vice of the disposition is one thing, and the vice of
the act is another. For as the nature of the disposition, and the nature of the act, are different; so the vice, or the
moral badness of the one, is a different badness from that of the other. The one and the other is a bad thing
whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence, 5. Evil dispositions or acts should be denominated such,
not from their cause but from their nature. Were it otherwise, personal fault, or blame, could never exist; for
the vicious act would transfer the blame to the disposition, and the disposition to the cause of that; whereby
persons would be free from blame, and this would attach to principles only. But to suppose a moral agent incapable
of blameworthiness, which on the supposition would be the case, is a gross absurdity. It would be to suppose
SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…