340 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
banks. In the elect, God cures these diseases in the mode
which will shortly be explained; in others, he only lays
them under such restraint as may prevent them from break
ing forth to a degree incompatible with the preservation of
the established order of things. Hence, how much soever
men may disguise their impurity, some are restrained only
by shame, others by a fear of the laws, from breaking out
into many kinds of wickedness. Some aspire to an honest
life, as deeming it most conducive to their interest, while
others are raised above the vulgar lot, that, by the dignity of
their station, they may keep inferiors to their duty. Thus
God, by his providence, curbs the perverseness of nature,
preventing it from breaking forth into action, yet without
rendering it inwardly pure.
4. The objection, however, is not yet solved. For we
must either put Cataline on the same footing with Camil-
lus, or hold Camillus to be an example that nature, when
carefully cultivated, is not wholly void of goodness. I admit
that the specious qualities which Camillus possessed were
divine gifts, and appear entitled to commendation when
viewed in themselves. But in what way will they be proofs
of a virtuous nature ? Must we not go back to the mind, and
from it begin to reason thus ? If a natural man possesses such
integrity of manners, nature is not without the faculty of
studying virtue. But what if his mind was depraved and per
verted, and followed anything rather than rectitude ? Such
it undoubtedly was, if you grant that he was only a natural
man. How then will you laud the power of human nature
for good, if, even where there is the highest semblance of
integrity, a corrupt bias is always detected ? Therefore, as you
would not commend a man for virtue whose vices impose upon
you by a show of virtue, so you will not attribute a power
of choosing rectitude to the human will while rooted in
depravity, (see August. Lib. iv., Cont. Julian.) Still, the
surest and easiest answer to the objection is, that those are
not common endowments of nature, but special gifts of God,
which he distributes in divers forms, and, in a definite mea
sure, to men otherwise profane. For which reason, we
hesitate not, in common language, to say, that one is of a