through the moral perfection of his nature, he necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and
holiness; but on the contrary, his praise is the greater: herein consists the height of his glory.
The same author (p. 56.) supposes, that herein appears the excellent “character of a wise
and good man, that though he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not;
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but suffers himself to be directed by fitness;” and that, in this conduct, “he imitates the
blessed God.” And yet, he supposes it is contrary wise with the blessed God; not that he
suffers himself to be directed by fitness, when “he can choose, contrary to the .fitness of
things;” but that “he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things;” as he says, p. 42. “That
it is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any
fitness or goodness in things:” Yea, he supposes, (p. 31.) That if a man “were perfectly wise
and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the
fitness of things.”
One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it
derogate nothing from the glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in
some things, then neither does it to he thus determined in all things; from any thing in the
nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from (God’s freedom, independence, absolute
supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state, or manner of acting; or as implying
any infirmity, restraint, or subjection. And it the thing be such as well consists with God’s
glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of
ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God’s glory too
much.
715
SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.