the least intermeddled with, by any thing meant in the true scope and design of this place
in Ezekiel.
On the whole, if any do not like the philosophy or the metaphysics (as some perhaps
may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that
a proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in fact, with respect to the de-
pendence of the state and course of things in the universe on the sovereign constitutions of
the supreme Author and Lord of all—who gives account to none of any of his matters, and
whose ways are past finding out—will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and
sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the justice of God,
respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word, concerning; the derivation of
depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity.
This is enough, one would think, for ever to silence such bold expressions as these—“If
this be just,—if the Scriptures teach such doctrine, &c. then the Scriptures are of no
use—understanding is no understanding,—and, what a god must he be, that can thus curse
innocent creatures!— Is this thy god, o Christian!”—&c. &c.
It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter,
in which we have had occasion to say so much about the imputation of Adam’s sin) concern-
ing the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note among the dissenters in England,
relating to a partial imputation of Adam’s first sin.
One of them supposes, that this sin, though truly imputed to infants, so that thereby
they are exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to them in such a degree, as
that upon this account they should be liable to eternal punishment, as Adam himself was,
but only to temporal death, or annihilation; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made
infinitely more guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe; that to suppose,
God imputes not all the guilt of Adam’s sin, but only some little part of it, relieves nothing
but one’s imagination. To think of poor little infants bearing such torments for Adam’s sin,
as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation,
may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it.
But it does not at all relieve one’s reason. There is no rule of reason, that can be supposed
to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which was committed by one, to another who
did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished
in part. For all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the imputation; not the quantity or
degree of what is imputed. If there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against
a proper derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not
act; then it lies against all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against
imputing Adam’s sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, That Adam
and his posterity are not one. But this lies as properly against charging a part of the guilt, as
the whole. For Adam’s posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a
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CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.