without overthrowing it; the thing supposed in it being that which denies itself. To suppose
the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind chooses
without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it
can follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any dif-
ficulty in the instances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one as good
as another; concerning which this author supposes the mind in fact has a choice, and so in
effect supposes that it has a preference; it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty,
as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose,
they prove that a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose; because
if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and does as much contradict
him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.
2. There is no great difficulty in showing, in such instances as are alleged, not only that
it must needs be so, that the mind must be influenced in its choice by something that has a
preponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so. A little attention to our own experi-
ence, and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient
to clear up the matter.
Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me; and because I am required by a super-
ior, or desired by a friend, or on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some
one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger. Not being limited or directed, in
the first proposal, to any one in particular; and there being nothing in the squares, in
themselves considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-four, more than another;
in this case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgularly called accident, 116
by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view, which my eye is
especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which
I shall be directed to by some other such like accident. Here are several steps of the mind
proceeding (though all may be done, as it were, in a moment). The first step is its general
determination that it will touch one of the squares. The next step is another general determ-
ination to give itself up to accident, in some certain way; as to touch that which shall be
most in the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The third and last
step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot, even that square, which,
by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others.
Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute
indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in
the first step, the mind’s general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots: the
116 I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called accident; that it is nothing akin to the
Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, or something not connected with any thing foregoing; but that
it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, unforeseen by men, and not owing to their design.
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SECTION VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly…