vices, enjoys wealth, and keeps concubines, and parasites, and is owner of a splendid mansion, and lives an idle life.”406 And many instances of the sort they string together, and weave a long account of complaint against the providence of God. What then are we to say to them? Now if they were Greeks, and were to tell us that the universe is governed by some one or other, we should in turn address to them the self-same 140 words, “What then, are things without a providence? How then is it that ye reverence gods, and worship genii and heroes? For if there is a providence, some one or other superintends the whole.” But if any, whether Christians or Heathen, should be impatient at this, and be wavering, what shall we say to them? “Why, could so many good things, tell me, arise of themselves? The daily light? The beautiful order and the forethought that exist in all things? The mazy dances of the stars? The equable course of nights and days? The regular gradation of nature in vegetables, and animals, and men? Who, tell me, is it that ordereth these? If there were no superintending Being, but all things combined together of themselves, who then was it that made this vault revolve, so beautiful, so vast, I mean the sky, and set it upon the earth, nay more, upon the waters? Who is it that gives the fruitful seasons? Who implanted so great power in seeds and vegetables? For that which is accidental is necessarily disorderly; whereas that which is orderly implies design. For which, tell me, of the things around us that are accidental, is not full of great disorder, and of great tumult and confusion? Nor do I speak of things accidental only, but of those also which imply some agent, but an unskillful agent. For example, let there be timber and stone, and let there be lime withal; and let a man unskilled in building take them, and begin building, and set hard to work; will he not spoil and destroy everything? Again, take a vessel without a pilot, containing everything which a vessel ought to contain, without a shipwright; I do not say that it is unequipped and unfin- ished, but though well equipped, it will not be able to sail. And could the vast extent of earth standing on the waters, tell me, ever stand so firmly, and so long a time, without some power to hold it together?407 And can these views have any reason? Is it not the extreme of absurdity to conceive such a notion? And if the earth supports the heaven, behold another burden still; but if the heaven also is borne upon the waters, there arises again another question. Or rather not another question, for it is the work of providence. For things which are borne upon the water ought not to be made convex, but concave. Wherefore? Because the whole 406 [This difficulty is as old as David. Chrysostom does not here suggest David’s solution of the problem,—the spiritual compensations here and hereafter. And Paul could say even to a slave in his day, “Wast thou called being a slave? Care not for it. Nay, if thou art even able to be free, make use of thy having been called as a slave, rather than accept thy freedom.” (1 Cor. vii. 21.) And even Epictetus said something similar. A little below, Chrysostom touches this higher Theodicy: “One thing alone is evil; that is, to sin.”—G.A.] 407 [On Chrysostom’s geography and astronomy, see Homily IX., Concerning the Statues, Vol. IX. of this series, pp. 403, 404, with notes by Rev. W. R. W. Stevens, M.A. Compare Ps. xxiv. 2.—G.A.] 259 Ephesians 5:15,16,17