tunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already before volition
has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition.
But a thing after it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence; it is too
late for that.
If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz. in the Will determining its own
acts, having free opportunity and being without all necessity; this is the same as to say, that
liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to have what determinations of
the Will it pleases. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last Dictates of the Under-
standing, be the same thing, then liberty consists in the mind having power and opportunity
to choose its own Dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determ-
ination of choice prior to the Dictate of Understanding, and the ground of it; which cannot
consist with the Dictate of the Understanding being the determination of choice itself.
Here is no alternative, but to recur to the old absurdity of one determination before
another, and the cause of it; and another before, determining that; end so on in infinitum.
If the last Dictate of the Understanding be the determination of the Will itself, and the soul
be free with regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom; then the soul, before
that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice determ-
ines, in every case, what that Dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise that Dictate,
as to the Will, is necessary; and the acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that
there is a determination of the mind prior to that Dictate of the Understanding, an act of
choice going before it, choosing and determining what that Dictate of the Understanding
shall be: and this preceding act of choice, being a free Act of Will, must also be the same
with another last Dictate of the Understanding: And if the mind also be free in that Dictate
of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on for ever.
Besides, if the Dictate of the Understanding, and determination of the Will be the same,
this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the same. Whether they be
the same or no, I will not now dispute; but only would observe, that if it be so, and the
Arminian notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understanding, free
of all necessity; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and
determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over
its own determinations, the more free: then the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must
consist in the independence of the Understanding on any evidence or appearance of things,
or any thing whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understand-
ing’s determination. And what a liberty is this! consisting in an ability, freedom, and easiness
of judging, either according to evidence, or against it; having a sovereign command over
itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to
its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive
reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and such like moral means and inducements. The
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SECTION IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates…