23. For as to that which we hear said by you, that some of the gods are good, that others,
on the contrary, are bad, and rather inclined to indulge in wanton mischief,4871 and that
the usual rites are paid to the one party that they may show favour, but to the others that
they may not do you harm,—with what reason this is said, we confess that we cannot under-
stand. For to say that the gods are most benevolent, and have gentle dispositions, is not only
pious and religious, but also true; but that they are evil and sinister, should by no means be
listened to, inasmuch as that divine power has been far removed and separated from the
disposition which does harm.4872 But whatever can occasion calamity, it must first be seen
what it is, and then it should be removed very far from the name of deity.
Then, supposing that we should agree with you that the gods promote good fortune and
calamity, not even in this case is there any reason why you should allure some of them to
grant you prosperity, and, on the other hand, coax others with sacrifices and rewards not
to do you harm. First, because the good gods cannot act badly, even if they have been wor-
shipped with no honour,—for whatever is mild and placid by nature, is separated widely
from the practice and devising of mischief; while the bad knows not to restrain his ferocity,
although he should be enticed to do so with a thousand flocks and a thousand altars. For
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neither can bitterness change itself into sweetness, dryness into moisture, the heat of fire
into cold, or what is contrary to anything take and change into its own nature that which
is its opposite. So that, if you should stroke a viper with your hand, or caress a poisonous
scorpion, the former will attack you with its fangs, the latter, drawing itself together, will
fix its sting in you; and your caressing will be of no avail, since both creatures are excited to
do mischief, not by the stings of rage, but by a certain peculiarity of their nature. It is thus
of no avail to wish to deserve well of the sinister deities by means of sacrifices, since,
whether you do this, or on the contrary do not, they follow their own nature, and by inborn
laws and a kind of necessity are led to those things, to do which4873 they were made.
Moreover, in this way4874 both kinds of gods cease to possess their own powers, and to retain
their own characters. For if the good are worshipped that they may be favourable, and sup-
plication is made in the same way to the others, on the contrary, that they may not be injur-
ious, it follows that it should be understood that the propitious deities will show no favour
if they receive no gifts, and become bad instead of good;4875 while, on the contrary, the bad,
4871 Lit., “more prompt to lust of hurting.”
4872 Lit., “nature of hurting.”
4873 The ms. reads ad ea quæ facti sunt, understood seemingly as above by the edd., by supplying ad before
quæ. Oehler, however, proposes quia—“because they were made for them.” The reading must be regarded as
doubtful.
4874 i.e., if sacrifices avail to counteract the malevolent dispositions of the gods.
4875 Lit., “these.” This clause, omitted by Oberthür, is also omitted without remark by Orelli.
Chapter XXIII.
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Chapter XXIII.