else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his
liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and established the human
nature, the soul being united to a body in proper state that the soul preferring or choosing
such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously
follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk,
but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such
alterations of my external sensations and motions; together with a concurring habitual ex-
pectation that it will be so; having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate
preference, such sensations and motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise.
But it is not so in the case of flying; though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer
flying; yet he does not prefer, or desire, under circumstances in view, any immediate exertion
of the members of his body in order to it; because he has no expectation that he should obtain
the desired end by any such exertion; and he does not prefer, or incline to, any bodily exer-
tion, under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully
distinguish the proper objects of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and
such like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference; or that a
man’s choosing liking best, or being pleased with a thing, are not the same with his willing
that thing. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus
or thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases are in common speech the same
thing.
Mr. Locke 106 says, “The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire; which in the very
same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills sets us upon. A
man, says he, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at
the same time I am speaking, I may wish not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the Will
and Desire run counter.” I do not suppose, that Will and Desire are words of precisely the
same signification: Will seems to be a word of more general signification, extending to things
present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation
and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot
think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man
never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary
to his Will. The forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, is no proof that he ever
does. He may, on some consideration or other will to utter speeches which have a tendency
to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade him; but yet his Will
and Desire do not run counter all: the thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and
he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In this instance, it is not
carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were, it would
106 Hum. Und. vol. i. p203, 204
519
SECTION I. Concerning the Nature of the Will