modes of conception, by Holy Scripture, the sacred and inspired writers by such names, as
by well-directed shafts, indicating the central point of the idea they had in view; even though
these words, when taken in their literal and obvious signification, seem not above suspicion,
but each single one of them, unless we allow it to be predicated of God by some process of
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conception, will not escape the taint of a blasphemous suggestion. But it would be a lengthy
task to bring them forward, and elucidate in every case how, in the general idea, these words
have been perverted1142 out of their obvious meanings, and how it is only in connection
with the conceptive faculty that the names of God can be reconciled with that reverence
which is His due.
But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired
Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm that the words are indicative
of His nature itself? If so, he asserts that the Divine nature is multiform, and that the variety
which it displays in what is signified by the names is very complex. For the meanings of the
words Bread and Lion are not the same, nor those of Axe and Water1143, but to each of
them we can assign a definition of its own, of which the others do not partake. They do not,
therefore, signify nature or essence, yet no one will presume to say that this nomenclature
is quite inappropriate and unmeaning. If, then, these words are given us, but not as indicative
of essence, and every word given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these
appellations be fitly applied to the Only-begotten Son of God, except in connection with
the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under various
names, according to the variety of His operations, so that we may think of Him in the aspect
so named. What harm, then, is done to our reverential ideas of God by this mental operation,
instituted with a view to our thinking upon the things done, and which we call conception,
though if any one choose to call it by some other name, we shall make no objection.
But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms
in so many words, that “these names are the work of human thought and conception, and
that, by the exercise of this operation of the mind by some, results are arrived at which no
Apostle or Evangelist has taught.” And after this doughty onslaught he raises that sanctimo-
nious voice of his, spitting out his foul abuse at us with a tongue well schooled to such lan-
1142 διαβέβληται. The Latin, “vulgo usurpata sunt,” misses the force of the Greek. Or “are disliked because
of their obvious meaning.” Cf. above “even though these words…seem not above suspicion (διαβεβλῆοθαι
δοκεῖ).” For this use of διαβάλλεσθαι (to be brought into suspicion or odium), cf. Origen c. Cels. iii. 58,
διαβεβλημενῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν, i.e. “who has quite broken with virtue and decency?” and vi.
42, where Celsus blasphemously says, that “the Son of God ought to have himself punished the Devil, rather
than frighten with his threats that mankind which had been dragged into the quarrel by himself” (τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
διαβεβλημένοις ἀνθρώποις): a passage quite missed in the Latin.
1143 S. John vii. 37
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.