sin; mercies abused and frowns despised; mercy and justice, and all the divine perfections,
trampled on; and the honour of each person in the Trinity trod in the dirt. Now if one sinful
word or thought has so much evil in it, as to deserve eternal destruction, how do they deserve
to be eternally cast off and destroyed, that are guilty of so much sin!
II. If with man’s sinfulness, we consider God’s sovereignty, it may serve further to clear
God’s justice in the eternal rejection and condemnation of sinners, from men’s cavils and
objections. I shall not now pretend to determine precisely, what things are, and what things
are not, proper acts and exercises of God’s holy sovereignty; but only, that God’s sovereignty
extends to the following things.
1. That such is God’s sovereign power and right, that he is originally under no obligation
to keep men from sinning; but may in his providence permit and leave them to sin. He was
not obliged to keep either angels or men from falling. It is unreasonable to suppose, that
God should be obliged, if he makes a reasonable creature capable of knowing his will, and
receiving a law from him, and being subject to his moral government at the same time to
make it impossible for him to sin, or break his law. For if God be obliged to this, it destroys
all use of any commands, laws, promises, or threatenings, and the very notion of any moral
government of God over those reasonable creatures. For to what purpose would it be, for
God to give such and such laws, and declare his holy will to a creature, and annex promises
and threatenings to move him to his duty, and make him careful to perform it, if the creature
at the same time has this to think of, that God is obliged to make it impossible for him to
break his laws? How can God’s threatenings move to care or watchfulness, when, at the
same time, God is obliged to render it impossible that he should be exposed to the threaten-
ings? Or, to what purpose is it for God to give a law at all? For according to this supposition,
it is God, and not the creature, that is under law. It is the lawgiver’s care, and not the subject’s,
to see that his law is obeyed; and this care is what the lawgiver is absolutely obliged to! If
God be obliged never to permit a creature to fall, there is an end of all divine laws, or govern-
ment, or authority of God over the creature; there can be no manner of use of these things.
God may permit sin, though the being of sin will certainly ensue on that permission:
and so, by permission, he may dispose and order the event. If there were any such thing as
chance, or mere contingence, and the very notion of it did not carry a gross absurdity, (as
might easily be shown that it does,) it would have been very unfit that God should have left
it to mere chance, whether man should fall or no. For chance, if there should be any such
thing, is undesigning and blind. And certainly it is more fit that an event of so great import-
ance, and which is attended with such an infinite train of great consequences, should be
disposed and ordered by infinite wisdom, than that it should be left to blind chance.
If it be said, that God need not have interposed to render it impossible for man to sin,
and yet not leave it to mere contingence or blind chance neither; but might have left it with
man’s free will, to determine whether to sin or no: I answer, if God did leave it to man’s free
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DISCOURSE. IV. The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners.