Chapter XLIV.—Ordinate and Inordinate.
Then the old man: “I should like to hear
from you why those useless things are made by the will of that supreme
mind?” “If,” said he, “it is fully
manifest to you that there is in them the work of mind and reason, then
you will not hesitate to say also why they were made, and to declare
that they have been rightly made.” To this the old man
answered: “I am not able, my son, to say that those things
which seem formed by art are made by mind, by reason of other things
which we see to be done unjustly and disorderly in the
world.” “If,” says Aquila, “those things
which are done disorderly do not allow you say that they are done by
the providence of God, why do not those things which are done orderly
compel you to say that they are done by God, and that irrational nature
cannot produce a rational work? For it is certain, nor do we at
all deny, that in this world some things are done orderly, and some
disorderly. Those things, therefore, that are done rationally,
believe that they are done by providence; but those that are done
irrationally and inordinately, that they befall naturally, and happen
accidentally. But I wonder that men do not perceive, that where
there is sense things may be done ordinately and inordinately, but
where there is no sense neither the one nor the other can be done; for
reason makes order, and the course of order necessarily produces
something inordinate, if anything contrary happen to disturb
order.” Then the old man: “This very thing I
wish you to show me.”