sensation; and my satisfaction, that I have had them heretofore, depends on the clearness
of my memory, and not on the strength of my reliance on any divine testimony. So likewise,
my doubting whether I have, or have had, such individual inward acts, is not of itself of the
nature of unbelief, though it may arise from unbelief indirectly; because, if I had had more
faith, the actings of it would have been more sensible, and the memory of them more clear,
and so I should have been better satisfied that I had them.
God appears to have given Abraham’s servant a revelation, that the damsel in whom
cxi
he found certain marks,— her coming to draw water with a pitcher to that well, and her
readiness to give him and his camels drink,—should be Isaac’s wife; and therefore his assent-
ing to this, was of the nature of faith, having divine testimony for its foundation. But his
believing that Rebekah was the damsel who had these individual marks, his knowing that
she came to draw water, and that she let down her pitcher, was not of the nature of faith.
His knowing this was not from divine testimony, but from the testimony of his own senses.
(Vide Gen. xxiv.)
You speak of ‘a saint’s doubting of his good estate, as a part of unbelief, and the opposite
of faith, considered in its full compass and latitude, as one branch of unbelief, one ingredient
in unbelief; and of assurance of a man’s good estate, as one thing that belongs to the exercise
of faith.’ I do not know whether I take your meaning in these expressions. If you mean, that
a person’s believing himself to be in a good estate, is one thing which appertains to the essence
of saving faith, or that saving faith, in all that belongs to its essence, yea its perfection, cannot
be without implying it, I must humbly ask leave to differ from you. That my believing that
I am in a good estate, is no part or ingredient in the essence of saving faith, is evident from
this, that the essence of saving faith must be complete in me, before it can be true that I am
in a good estate. If I have not as yet acted faith, yea if there be any thing wanting in me to
make up the essence of saving faith, then I am not as yet in a state of salvation, and therefore
can have no ground to believe that I am so. Any thing that belongs to the essence of saving
faith is prior, in the order of nature, to a man’s being in a state of salvation, because it is
saving faith which brings him into such a state. And therefore believing that he is in such a
state, cannot be one thing which is essential or necessary, in order to his being in such a
state; for that would imply a contradiction. It would be to suppose a man’s believing that
he is in a good estate, to be prior, in the order of nature, to his being in a good estate. But a
thing cannot be both prior and posterior, antecedent and consequent, with respect to the
very same thing. The real truth of a proposition is in the order of nature first, before its being
believed to be true. But, till a man has already all that belongs to the essence of saving faith,
that proposition, that he is in a good estate, is not as yet true. All the propositions contained
in the gospel, all divine testimonies that we have in God’s word, are true already, are already
laid for a foundation for faith, and were laid long ago. But that proposition, I am in a good
estate, not being one of them, is not true till I have first believed; and therefore this propos-
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CHAPTER XV. Arrival of David Brainerd at Northampton. His sickness and…