an impossibility, that we think he has fully proved, there can be no true virtue on any other principle. To illustrate
this, suppose a man has strong attachment to himself, but none to his family: will that force of affection constitute
him virtuous? Again, suppose his affection, with any assignable force, be extended to his family, but repels the
well-founded claims of a whole nation, can that be virtuous? Or if he extend his force of affection to a whole
nation, if it repels all the human race beside, can it be virtuous? Moreover, suppose his ardent affection embrace
the whole human kind, can it be virtuous while it repels all other created beings? Or if, together with himself,
he feels an affectionate attachment, in different and proportionate degrees, to every created being, but repels
the Creator of all, can that forcible and orderly affection be denominated truly virtuous? If the reply be in the
affirmative, then an atheist may be virtuous, which is absurd. Therefore, attachment to the Supreme Being. or
to being in general, is essential to the very nature of true virtue. 7. No one yet denied, except those who deny
the being of a God, that supreme love to him is virtuous, if any thing be so. The great Supreme is infinite, and
if he ought not to be loved according to his greatness, what constitutes the crime of Idolatry? And if supreme
love to an infinite being were inconsistent with subordinate attachments, we ought to extinguish the supremacy
of our love to God, before we could discharge our duty to our fellow-creatures, which every one must allow to
be preposterous. 8. As the second objection is founded on the same principle which was assumed in the first, it
has been already virtually answered. But it may be controverted on another account. That “extended views” di-
minish the strength of particular affections, does not appear consonant with experience. Is it consistent with
experience, that the acquisition of a second friend must rob the first of a moiety of his friendly affection? Does
a parent experience any diminution of affection to a first child, in proportion to a subsequent increase of number?
Has a tenth child but a tenth part of a mother’s former affection to her first? Does a man love his neighbour the
less because his views are extended to an infinite object? Or when the heart, or supremacy of affection, is fixed
on God, is virtuous affection to man diminished? 9. Besides, this objection proceeds on another gratuitous
principle, viz. that there may be true virtue, or virtuous affection, when our views of existence do not include
God. For if we view him, we view an object infinite and unchangeable, who is all in all, and the sum of existence.
That our views of the extent of the created universe are capable of perpetual enlargement, is no good reason
why “particular affections” should fluctuate, become disproportionate, or vicious: any more than the love of
God should constitute the love of our neighbour criminal. So that there is no necessity for “the balance to be
continually fluctuating by the weights being taken out of one scale and put into the other:” except it be by cor-
recting past mistakes, as those do, who, when grown up to manhood, put away childish things. 10. Virtuous
love, however forcible to oneself, to relatives, to a nation, to mankind, or to the whole created universe, is not
virtuous because of this particular, private, or limited attachment, but because of its tendency to God, except
we prostitute the term virtue to signify something claimed equally by the worst and the best of men. And this
general attachment, or love to God and universal being, does not at all counteract, or even lessen, the commend-
able force of private ones, any more than the force of general gravity tends to destroy the force of cohesion. 11.
Mr. H’s third and last objection, like the preceding ones, rests on a mistaken apprehension of Mr. E’s real senti-
ment. Mr. H. still confounds the nature of attachment with its degree. If virtue, according to Mr. E. consists
exclusively in love to being in general, his meaning is, that no force of affection which has not universal being
for its ultimate object, can be virtuous, in the most proper sense of the word. He cannot mean that there is no
virtuous love to particular beings: for, in perfect consistency with his views, even a love of ourselves may be
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CHAPTER VII. The reasons of many mistakes