of the Most High. For such evidence it behoves us to be thankful. Millions are now in heaven, who enjoyed no
other evidence while on earth than that of faith. But this is no sufficient reason why those who have opportunity
should make no further inquiries into the subject. Some, indeed, suppose, that no rational evidence is in the
present state attainable by man. But why any should so conclude it is difficult to say, except it be, that they wish
to make their own minds the standard of all others, or their own attainments the ne plus ultra of moral philosophy.
Such persons are not likely to acknowledge or perceive the real evidence, on supposition that it is laid before
them, as their minds will be strongly prejudiced against all reasoning on the subject 4. One thing, however, is
incontrovertible, as necessarily connected with the axioms, that the existence of moral evil, and the spotless and
infinitely excellent moral character of God. are perfectly consistent; and therefore there must be somewhere
good evidence of it And another thing is equally plain, that the brighter the evidence we have of the truth of the
proposition which asserts the consistency of the two axioms, the more will be our acquaintance with God’s real
character, and the real nature of sin, which all must allow to be advantageous. To which we may add; that increased
evidence of such a proposition is far from being injurious, may be further inferred from this consideration, that
the higher any beings rise in holiness and happiness, the more clear will be that evidence to their view. 5. The
terms of the question are so plain, and so generally understood, that it is scarcely necessary to notice them; we
may, however, briefly observe, that moral evil is what stands in direct opposition to the moral character of God;
and that this latter includes universal rectitude, or holiness, and perfect benevolence. Therefore, postulate.
Whatever is perfectly consistent with universal rectitude, and perfect benevolence, is consistent with the moral
perfections of God. The reader will observe, that what is asserted of rectitude and benevolence, is different; the
one is said to be universal and the other perfect only. Every attribute of Jehovah is in ITSELF both perfect and
universal; but not relatively so. Thus his rectitude is both perfect in itself, and universal with respect to its object:
but his benevolence, however infinitely perfect, is restricted as to its objects, both in extent and in degree. And
this restriction is necessary two ways: 6. First, the objects of benevolence, at least in this world, compose a system;
and every system, whether natural or moral, implies a subordination and comparative superiority of parts;
therefore the very idea of a systematic whole implies a restriction of benevolence as to extent and degree. 7.
Secondly, the exercise of benevolence is an exercise of will; and the exercise of will implies diversity of objects,
and a preference of some, rather than others, to occupy the more excellent parts of the whole system; so that
perfect universality, or a strict equality of benevolence, without a distinguishing preference, is necessarily excluded
by the very nature of benevolence in exercise. 8. Divine benevolence, therefore, admits of gradations, from the
smallest degree conceivable to the utmost extent of the system; while rectitude admits of no such degree. Were
we to attempt an illustration of so abstracted a subject by mental images, we might say. that rectitude in its ex-
ercise towards the creatures, may be compared to a plain surface as widely extended as the universe, of infinitely
perfect polish, and without a flaw in any part. Hence, in its exercise. It is universal as its objects; and can no
more admit of degrees, than a perfect polish can admit of flaws. On the contrary, benevolence may be compared
to a cone, in an inverted form, the vertex of which is in contact with a point of that plane, and which, from the
least possible degree, is capable of rising at sovereign pleasure, in its exercise towards the universe, to such a
height, as that the base of it may be, or may not be, of equal extent with the plane below. 9. From just views of
benevolence we may infer, that its exercise is purely free, and undeserved by the creature; being the fruit of will,
choice, and sovereign pleasure. The absence of it, with respect to creatures, implies no flaw in perfect rectitude.
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…