that it should have any thing to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was
before, and so the Creator become dependent on the creature ?
2. Whatsoever is good and valuable in itself, is worthy that God should value it with an
ultimate respect. It is therefore worthy to be made the last end of his operation; if it be
properly capable of being attained. For it may be supposed that some things, valuable and
excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation;
because their existence, in all possible respects, must be conceived of as prior to any divine
operation. Thus God’s existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in
themselves, cannot be supposed to be the end of any divine operation; for we cannot conceive
of them as, in any respect, consequent on any works of God. But whatever is in itself valuable,
absolutely so, and is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end
or the divine operation—Therefore,
3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the
creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which
was superior in value to all others, that must be worthy to be God’s last end in the creation;
and also worthy to be his highest end.—In consequence of this it will follow,
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4. That if God himself be, in any respect, properly capable of being his own end in the
creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to himself, as his
last and highest end, in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely
the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and
excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And therefore, if God has respect
to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest
respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness,
and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to
suppose otherwise. At least, a great part of the moral rectitude of God, whereby he is disposed
to every thing that is fit, suitable, and amiable in itself, consists in his having the highest
regard to that which is in itself highest and best. The moral rectitude of God must consist
in a due respect to things that are objects of moral respect; that is, to intelligent beings capable
of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect
to that Being to whom most is due; for God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The
worthiness of others is as nothing to his; so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him
belongs the whole of the respect that any intelligent being is capable of. To him belongs all
the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect of the heart
which is due, or which fitness and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest
regard to be paid to God; and the denying of supreme regard here would be a conduct infin-
itely the most unfit. Hence it will follow, that the moral rectitude of the disposition, inclin-
ation, or affection of God chiefly consists in a regard to himself, infinitely above his regard
to all other beings; or, in other words, his holiness consists in this.
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SECTION I. The general dictates of reason.