SECT. I.
Some things observed in general, which reason dictates.
Having observed these things, to prevent confusion, I now proceed to consider what
may
, and what may
not
, be supposed to be God’s ultimate end in the creation of the world.
Indeed this affair seems property to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determined what was designed, in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe we behold, it becomes us to attend to, and rely on what HE has told us, who was the architect. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were, in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind—who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost
improvements of their own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the
author
of the world was—would ever have obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated, and wonderful a work of his hands. And though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their
faculties, and has taught men how to use their reason; and though mankind now, through the long-continued assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to great attainments in the habitual exercise of reason; yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason, to determine the affair of God’s last end in the creation of the world, without being herein
principally
guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions concerning this very
matter. Nevertheless, as objections have chiefly been made, against what I think the Scriptures have truly revealed, from the pretended dictates of reason, I would, in the
first
place, soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair;—and
then
proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it.
As to the
first
of these, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason:
1. That no notion of God’s last end in the creation of the world, is agreeable to reason, which would truly imply any indigence, insufficiency, and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy: that he cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from, the creature;
or be the subject of any sufferings, or diminution of his glory and felicity, from any other being. The notion of God creating the world, in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation; which implies a being receiving its existence, and all that belongs to it, out of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute, and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its ALL
from God, entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that
it
should have any thing to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator become dependent on the creature ?
2. Whatsoever is good and valuable
in itself
, is worthy that God should value it with an
ultimate
respect. It is therefore worthy to be made the
last end
of his operation; if it be properly
capable
of being attained. For it may be supposed that some things, valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being
attained
in any divine operation; because their existence, in all possible respects, must be conceived of as
prior
to any divine operation. Thus God’s existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in themselves, cannot be supposed to be the
end
of any divine operation; for we cannot conceive of them as, in any respect,
consequent
on any works of God. But whatever is
in itself valuable
, absolutely so, and is
capable
of being sought and
attained
, is worthy to be made a last end or the divine operation—Therefore,
3. Whatever that be which is
in itself
most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is
attainable
by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others,
that
must be worthy to be God’s
last
end in the creation; and also worthy to be his
highest
end.—In consequence of this it will follow,
4. That if God
himself
be, in
any
respect, properly
capable
of being his own end in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to
himself
, as his last and highest end, in this work; because he is
worthy
in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of
him. And therefore, if God has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least, a great part of the moral rectitude of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing that is fit, suitable, and amiable in itself, consists in his having the
highest regard to that which is in itself highest and best. The moral rectitude of God must consist in a due respect to things that are objects of moral respect; that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due; for God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to his; so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the
whole
of the respect that any intelligent being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect of the heart which is due, or which fitness and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be paid to God; and the denying of supreme regard here would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Hence it will follow, that the moral rectitude of the disposition, inclination, or affection of God
chiefly consists in a regard to himself, infinitely above his regard to all other beings; or, in other words, his holiness consists in this.
And if it be thus fit that God should
have
a supreme regard to himself, then it is fit that this supreme regard should
appear
in those things by which he makes himself known, or by his
word
and
works
,
i.e.
in what he
says
, and in what he
does
. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should
act
as having a chief regard to
himself; or act in such a manner, as to
show
that he has such a regard: that what is highest in God’s
heart
, may be highest in his
actions
and
conduct
. And if it was God’s intention, as there is great reason to think it was, that his
works
should exhibit an
image
of himself their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper representation of his divine excellencies, and especially his
moral
excellence, consisting in the
disposition of his heart
; then it is reasonable to suppose that his works are so wrought as to
show
this supreme respect to himself, wherein his moral excellence primarily consists.
When we are considering what would be most fit for God
chiefly
to respect, with regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge with greater ease and satisfaction, to consider, what we can
suppose
would be determined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude, that should be perfectly indifferent and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct disinterested person, whose
office it was to determine how things shall be most properly ordered in the whole kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and, upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should prevail in all proceedings. Now such a judge, in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care, that a greater part of the whole should be more respected, than the lesser, in proportion (other things being equal) to the measure
of existence. So that the
degree of regard
should always be in a
proportion compounded
of the
proportion of existence
, and
proportion of excellence
, or according to the degree of
greatness
and
goodness
, considered
conjunctly
. Such an arbiter, in considering the system of
created
intelligent beings by itself, would determine, that the
system in general
, consisting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater
share of regard, than only one individual. For, however considerable some of the individuals might be, no one exceeds others so much as to countervail all the system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but the system of
being in general
, comprehending the
sum total
of universal existence, both Creator and creature; still every part must be considered according to its importance, or the measure it has of
existence
and
excellence
. To
determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance; the
Supreme Being
, with all in him that is great and excellent, is to be compared with all that is to be found in the
whole creation
: and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings, in comparison of the
Creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance, or even as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the
degree
in which God should be regarded, by all intelligent existence, in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection, and excellence, so he must have all possible regard.
As he is every way the first and supreme, and as his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard. And as he is
God over all
, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme Head, with absolute and universal dominion; so it is
fit
that he should be so regarded by all, and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system: The
universality of things, in their whole compass and series, should look to him, in such a manner, as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and regard to creatures should, universally, be subordinate and subject.
When I speak of
regard
to be thus adjusted in the universal system, I mean the regard of the
sum total
; all intelligent existence, created and uncreated. For it is fit, that the regard of the
Creator
should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus, we must conclude, that such an arbiter as I have supposed, would determine, that the whole universe, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire
series of events, should proceed with a view to
God
, as the supreme and last end; that every wheel, in all its rotations, should move with a constant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul. Or, as if such an arbiter as I have before supposed, possessed of perfect wisdom and rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions.
Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third disinterested person. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is, nevertheless, just the same, as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest
fitness
, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which
have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose, because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested. For being
interested
unfits a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise, than as interest tends to mislead his
judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being absolutely perfect. And as there must be
some
supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, or otherwise there could be no order, it therefore belongs to God, whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so, to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if
perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.
I should think that these things might incline us to suppose, that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends, (however self-sufficient, immutable, and independent,) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.
5. Whatsoever is good, amiable, and valuable
in itself
,
absolutely
and
originally
, (which facts and events show that God aimed at in the creation of the world,) must be supposed to be regarded or aimed at by God
ultimately
, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose, from the perfection of God’s nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; because God’s
judgment and esteem are according to truth. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely on its own account, then it is the
ultimate
object of his value. For to suppose that he values it only for some
farther
end, is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values
for itself
, appears, in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he
must regard it as an
ultimate
end. And, therefore, if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step farther, and assert,
6. Whatsoever thing is
actually
the
effect
of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God’s creating the world. We see that it is a good which God
aimed
at by the creation of the world; because he has
actually attained
it by that means. For we may justly infer what God
intends
, by what he actually
does
; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without
design. But whatever God
intends
to attain, from a value for it, in his actions and works, that he
seeks
in those acts and works. Because, for an agent to
intend
to attain something he values by the means he uses, is the same thing as to
seek
it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his
end
in those means. Now, it being, by the supposition, what God
values ultimately
, it must therefore, by the preceding position, be
aimed at
by God, as an ultimate end of creating the world.