in greater detail in the treatise, De Diff. Essen. et Hypost.47, already referred to, where we
find once more the illustration employed in the Epistle to Terentius. The Nature of the
Father is beyond our comprehension; but whatever conception we are able to form of that
Nature, we must consider it to be common also to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: so far as
the οὐσία is concerned, whatever is predicated of any one of the Persons may be predicated
equally of each of the Three Persons, just as the properties of man, quâ man, belong alike
to Paul and Barnabas and Timothy: and as these individual men are differentiated by their
own particular attributes, so each Person of the Trinity is distinguished by a certain attribute
from the other two Persons. This way of putting the case naturally leads to the question, “If
you say, as you do say, that Paul and Barnabas and Timothy are ‘three men,’ why do you
not say that the Three Persons are ‘three Gods?’” Whether the question was presented in
this shape to S. Basil we cannot with certainty decide: but we may gather from his language
regarding the applicability of number to the Trinity what his answer would have been. He48
says that in acknowledging One Father, One Son, One Holy Spirit, we do not enumerate
them by computation, but assert the individuality, so to say, of each hypostasis—its distinct-
ness from the others. He would probably have replied by saying that strictly speaking we
ought to decline applying to the Deity, considered as Deity, any numerical idea at all, and
that to enumerate the Persons as “three” is a necessity, possibly, imposed upon us by language,
but that no conception of number is really applicable to the Divine Nature or to the Divine
26
Persons, which transcend number49. To S. Gregory, however, the question did actually
present itself as one demanding an answer, and his reply to it marks his departure from S.
Basil’s position, though, if the treatise, De Diff. Essen. et Hyp. be S. Basil’s, S. Gregory was
but following out and defending the view of his “master” as expressed in that treatise.
S. Gregory’s reply to the difficulty may be found in the letter, or short dissertation, ad-
dressed to Ablabius (Quod non sunt tres Dei), and in his treatise περὶ κοινῶν ἐννοίων. In
the latter he lays it down that the term θεός is a term οὐσίας σημαντικόν, not a term
προσώπων δηλωτικόν: the Godhead of the Father is not that in which He maintains His
differentiation from the Son: the Son is not God because He is Son, but because His essential
Nature is what it is. Accordingly, when we speak of “God the Father, God the Son, and God
the Holy Ghost,” the word and is employed to conjoin the terms expressive of the Persons,
not the repeated term which is expressive of the Essence, and which therefore, while applied
as it will be seen, treats the question as to the differentiation of the Persons somewhat differently, and rests his
answer on a basis theologically more scientific.
47 S. Bas. Ep. 38 (Benedictine Ed.).
48 De Spir. Sancto, §18.
49 On S. Basil’s language on this subject, see Dorner, Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Div. 1. vol. ii. pp.
309–11. (Eng. Trans.)
45
His Teaching on the Holy Trinity.