Orthodoxus. If, then, nothing that exists is contrary to itself, and these are contrary to
one another, they will not be one and the same matter—no, nor formed from one and the
same matter. But, again, I wish to ask, do you think that the parts of a thing are not destructive
of one another?
Valentinian. I do.
Orthodoxus. And that fire and water, and the rest likewise, are parts of matter?
Valentinian. I hold them to be so.
Orthodoxus. Why, then, do you not think that water is destructive of fire, and light of
darkness, and so on with the rest?
Valentinian. I do.
Orthodoxus. Then, if parts of a thing are not destructive of one another, and these are
found to be so, they will not be parts of the same thing. But if they are not parts of the same
thing, they will not be parts of one and the same matter. And, indeed, they will not be matter
362
either, because nothing that exists is destructive of itself. And this being the case with the
contraries, it is shown that they are not matter. This is enough on the subject of matter.
Now we must come to the examination of evils, and must necessarily inquire into the
evils among men. As to these, are they forms of the principle of evil, or parts of it? If forms,
evil will not have a separate existence distinct from them, because the species are to be sought
for in the forms, and underlie them. But if this is the case, evil has an origin. For its forms
are shown to have an origin—such as murder, and adultery, and the like. But if you will
have them to be parts of some principle of evil, and they have an origin, it also must have
an origin. For those things whose parts have an origin, are of necessity originated likewise.
For the whole consists of parts. And the whole will not exist if the parts do not, though there
may be some parts, even if the whole be not there.
Now there is nothing existing of which one part is originated, and another part not. But
if I were even to grant this, then there was a time when evil was not complete, namely, before
matter was wrought by God. And it attains completeness when man is produced by God;
for man is the maker of the parts of evil. And from this it follows that the cause of evil being
complete, is God the Creator, which it is impious to say. But if you say that evil is neither
of the things supposed, but is the doing of something evil, you declare that it has an origin.
For the doing of a thing makes the beginning of its existence. And besides this, you have
nothing further to pronounce evil. For what other action have you to point out as such, except
what happens among men? Now, it has been already shown that he who acts is not evil ac-
cording to his being, but in accordance with his evil doing.
Because there is nothing evil by nature, but it is by use that evil things become such. So
I say, says he, that man was made with a free-will, not as if there were already evil in existence,
which he had the power of choosing if he wished, but on account of his capacity of obeying
or disobeying God.
820
Concerning Free-Will.