give the Will opportunity to determine itself either way, either to good or bad, without laying
it under any bias to either: and so there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine
in favour of evil, as of good.
Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the Arminian
doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using
so many counsels, warnings, invitations, entreaties, &c. with sinners, to induce them to
forsake sin, and turn to the ways of virtue; and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will
follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows, at the same time,
that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at; yea, knows
that if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an effect,
and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity would this fix on him, who is in-
finitely holy and true!—So that theirs is the doctrine which, if pursued in its consequences,
does horribly reflect on the Most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy; and not the
doctrine of the Calvinist, according to their frequent and vehement exclamations and invect-
ives.
Corol 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears, that Arminian
principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable con-
sequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there
should ever be any such thing, in any case; or that any such thing should ever be conceived
of. For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contra-
diction. For it is absurd in itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act
of mind without any good intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose
a virtuous act with a good intention or aim; for to act for an end, is to act from a Motive.
So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good design and
end; and it is self-evident, there can be none without: consequently there can be no virtuous
act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of moral Agency, and the being of a faculty
of Will, cannot consist together; and that if there can be any such thing as either a virtuous
or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the Will; no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that
act which is performed without inclination, without Motive, without end, must be performed
without any concern of the Will. To suppose an act of the Will without these, implies a
contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was observed
before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to any thing; and this im-
plies, that in that act it desires nothing, and chooses nothing; so that there is no act of choice
in the case: and that is as much as to say, there is no act of Will in the case. Which very ef-
fectually shuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe; inasmuch as, according to
this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the Will is concerned: and according
to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the principles of Arminians
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SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence…