SECT. VII.
Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.
What has been said in the foregone section, has a tendency in some measure to evince
the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium
whereby the will is without all antecedent bias; that the determination of the Will to either
side may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and the
sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that. 118
But inasmuch as this has been of such long standing, and has been so generally received,
and so much insisted on by Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and
others, it may deserve a more full consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to a
more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion.
Now lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place Liberty in In-
difference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I
am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of Liberty of the Will as consisting in In-
difference, express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the Indif-
ference of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but an Indifference of the soul’s power,
of willing; or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can
go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one
as well as the other. This indeed seems to be a refining of some particular writers only, and
newly invented, which will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the
defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. I wish such refiners would thoroughly con-
sider, whether they distinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinction
between an Indifference of the soul as to its power or ability of choosing, and the soul’s In-
difference as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do not deceive themselves
in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at all. The Indifference of the soul as to
118 Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God,
and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with
necessity; the latter he holds to be without necessity; and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the
subject of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhorta-
tions and dehortations, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In
his Discourse on the five points, )p. 299, 300.) he says; “It is a freedom, (speaking of a freedom not only from
co-action, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render
our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments.” Excellent to this purpose,
are the words of Mr Thorndake: We say not, that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of
man alone in this state of treveil and preficience; the ground of which is God’s tender of a treaty, and conditions
of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and
threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with.”
SECTION VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.
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SECTION VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.…