CHAP. Z.] WHAT EVEEY MIND CERTAINLY KNOWS OF ITSELF. 255
Beliold thy own face ; which he can only do in a looking-glass.
For even our own face itself is out of the reach of our own
seeing it; because it is not there where our look can he
directed. But when it is said to the mind. Know thyself;
then it knows itself by that very stroke by which it under-
stands the word " thyself
;
" and this for no other reason than
that it is present to itself. But if it does not understand
what is said, then certainly it does not do as it is bid to do.
And therefore it is bidden to do that, which it does, when it
understands the very precept that bids it.
Chap. x.—Every mind knows certainly three things concerning itself—that it
understands, that it is, and that it lives.
13. Let it not then add anything to that which it knows
itself to be, when it is bidden to know itself. For it knows, at
any rate, that this is said to itself ; namely, to itself, that is, and
that lives, and that understands. But a dead body also is,
and cattle live ; but neither a dead body nor cattle understand.
Therefore it so knows that it so is, and that it so lives, as an
understanding is and lives. When, therefore, for example's sake,
the mind thinks itself air, it thinks that air understands ; it
knows, however, that itself understands, but it does not know
itself to be air, but only thinks so. Let it separate that which
it thinks itself ; let it discern that which it knows ; let this
remain to it, about which not even have they doubted who
have thought the mind to be this corporeal thing or that.
For certainly every mind does not consider itself to be air; but
some think themselves fire, others the brain, and some one kind
of corporeal thing, others another, as I have mentioned before
;
yet all know that they themselves understand, and are, and
live ; but they refer understanding to that which they under-
stand, but to be, and to live, to themselves. And no one
doubts, either that no one understands who does not live, or
that no one lives of whom it is not true that he is ; and that
therefore by consequence that which understands both is and
lives ; not as a dead body is which does not live, nor as a soul
lives which does not understand, but in some proper and more
excellent manner. Further, they know that they will, and
they equally know that no one can will who is not and who
does not live ; and they also refer that will itself to something