Chapter 8.—Of the Three Perturbations, Which the Stoics Admitted in the Soul of the
Wise Man to the Exclusion of Grief or Sadness, Which the Manly Mind Ought Not to Ex-
perience.
Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ,
the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three “perturbations” in the soul of the
wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment;
and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to
call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks
the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed,
and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man
ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose
that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his
mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution;
and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections
Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions;
and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη. And when I
made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned
by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: “There is no contentment to the wicked, saith
the Lord;”677 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils,
for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel:
“Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them?”678 which
seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. In-
deed, some interpreters have added “good things,” to make the expression more in conformity
with customary usage, and have given this meaning, “Whatsoever good deeds that ye would
that men should do unto you.” For they thought that this would prevent any one from
wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications,—lux-
urious banquets, for example,—on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he
would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is
translated, “good” does not occur, but only, “All things whatsoever ye would that men should
do unto you, do ye even so unto them,” and, as I believe, because “good” is already included
in the word “would;” for He does not say “desire.”
Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language,
we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose au-
thority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages
where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced
677 Isa. lvii. 21.
678 Matt. vii. 12.
Of the Three Perturbations, Which the Stoics Admitted in the Soul of the Wise Man to the Exclusion of Grief or Sadness, Which the Manly Mind Ought Not to Experience.
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Of the Three Perturbations, Which the Stoics Admitted in the Soul of the…