of nature,” as he himself admits, bears additional testimony to the Son’s name by reason of
His being begotten, and thus the correspondence of the name is according to the relation
of the Begotten to the Begetter, how comes it that he wrests the significance of the word
“Son” from its natural application, and changes the relation to “the thing made and its
maker”—a relation which applies not only in the case of the elements of the universe, but
might also be asserted of a gnat or an ant—that in so far as each of these is a thing made,
the relation of its name to its maker is similarly equivalent? The blasphemous nature of his
doctrine is clear, not only from many other passages, but even from those quoted: and as
for that “use of the saints” which he alleges that he follows in these expressions, it is clear
that there is no such use at all.
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This third book shows a third fall of Eunomius, as refuting himself, and…