The reason, moreover, why Christ uttered this saying is sufficiently plain from the im-
mediately preceding context. “Judge not,” He said, “that ye be not judged; for in the judgment
in which ye judge ye shall be judged.” Does this mean that if they have judged any one with
injustice they shall themselves be unjustly judged? Of course not; for there is no unrighteous-
ness with God. But it is thus expressed, “In the judgment in which ye judge ye shall be
judged,” as if it were said, In the will in which ye have dealt kindly with others ye shall be
set at liberty, or in the will in which ye have done evil to others ye shall be punished. As if
any one, for example, using his eyes for the gratification of base desires, were ordered to be
made blind, this would be a just sentence for him to hear, “In those eyes by which thou hast
sinned, in them hast thou deserved to be punished.” For every one uses the judgment of his
own mind, according as it is good or evil, for doing good or for doing evil. Wherefore it is
not unjust that he be judged in that in which he judges, that is to say, that he suffer the
penalty in the mind’s faculty of judgment when he is made to endure those evils which are
the consequences of the sinful judgment of his mind.
26. For while other torments which are prepared to be hereafter inflicted are visible,
torments occasioned by the same central cause, namely, a depraved will,—it is also the fact
that within the mind itself, in which the appetite of the will is the measure of all human ac-
tions, sin is followed immediately by punishment, which is for the most part increased in
proportion to the greater blindness of one by whom it is not felt. Therefore when He had
said, “With [or rather, as Augustin renders it, In] what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged,”
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He went on to add, “And in what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you.” A good
man, that is to say, will measure out good actions in his own will, and in the same shall
blessedness be measured unto him; and in like manner, a bad man will measure out bad
actions in his own will, and in the same shall misery be meted out to him; for in whatsoever
any one is good when his will aims at what is good, in the same he is evil when his will aims
at what is evil. And therefore it is also in this that he is made to experience bliss or misery,
viz. in the feeling experienced by his own will, which is the measure both of all actions and
of the recompenses of actions. For we measure actions, whether good or bad, by the quality
of the volitions which produce them, not by the length of time which they occupy. Were it
otherwise, it would be regarded a greater crime to fell a tree than to kill a man. For the
former takes a long time and many strokes, the latter may be done with one blow in a moment
of time; and yet, if a man were punished with no more than transportation for life for this
great crime committed in a moment, it would be said that he had been treated with more
clemency than he deserved, although, in regard to the duration of time, the protracted
punishment is not in any way to be compared with the sudden act of murder. Where, then,
is anything contradictory in the sentence objected to, if the punishments shall be equally
protracted or even alike eternal, but differing in comparative gentleness and severity? The
duration is the same; the pain inflicted is different in degree, because that which constitutes
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To Deogratias