Chapter LXX.
In the next place, he objects to the statement, as
if it were maintained by us, that “God will be able to do all
things,” not seeing even here how these words are meant, and what
“the
all things
” are which are included in it, and
how it is said that God “will be able.” But on these
matters it is not necessary now to speak; for although he might with a
show of reason have opposed this proposition, he has not done so.
Perhaps he did not understand the arguments which might be plausibly
used against it, or if he did, he saw the answers that might be
returned. Now in our judgment God can do everything which it is
possible for Him to do without ceasing to be God, and good, and
wise. But Celsus asserts—not comprehending the meaning of
the expression “God can do all things”—“that He
will not desire to do anything wicked,” admitting that He has the
power
, but not the
will
, to commit evil. We, on the
contrary, maintain that as that which by nature possesses the property
of sweetening other things through its own inherent sweetness cannot
produce bitterness contrary to its own peculiar nature,
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nor that whose nature it is to produce light
through its being light can cause darkness; so neither is God able to
commit wickedness, for the power of doing evil is contrary to His deity
and its omnipotence. Whereas if any one among existing things is
able to commit wickedness from being inclined to wickedness by nature,
it does so from not having in its nature the ability not to do
evil.
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ὥσπερ οὐ
δύναται τὸ
πεφυκὸς
γλυκαίνειν
τῷ γλυκυ
τυγχάνειν
πικράζειν,
παρὰ την
αὐτοῦ μόνην
αἰτίαν
.