as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures ac-
tually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them
was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God’s love of justice, and hatred of injustice,
would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to
prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that
God’s love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally
induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion
of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God’s nature makes a just regulation agree-
able, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion; the subject being supposed, and the
occasion given. But we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the
subjects, or order the occasion.
So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his
promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor
could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures be his last end in giving the creatures
being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has
bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition, which is called his faithfulness,
may move him in his providential disposals towards them; and this may be the end of many
of God’s works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises,
and may be in the lower sense his last end; because faithfulness and truth must be supposed
to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God
may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense,
which were not ultimate ends of the creation.
So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called, original
and independent, the other, consequential and dependent; for it is evident, the latter sort are
truly of the nature of ultimate ends; because though their being agreeable to the agent, be
consequential on the existence, yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are
agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose, that, to a righteous Being, doing
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justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and not merely
for the sake of some other end: And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between
two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.—It
may be observed, that when I speak of God’s ultimate end in the creation of the world, in
the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate
end.
Sixthly, It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation
of the world is alone that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends,
by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the
end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in cre-
ating, and the original ordination of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have
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Introduction—Explanation of terms.