CHAP. X.] POWER OF THE IMAGINATION. 281
it were, step by step one from the other, the second from the
first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third
:
since from the species of the body which is perceived, there
arises thatwhich comes to be in the sense of the perceiver ; and
from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this,
that which comes to be in the eye of the mind of the thinker.
And the will, therefore, thrice combines as it were parent with
offspring : first the species of the body with that to which it
gives birth in the sense of the body; and that again itself with
that which from it comes to be in the memory ; and this also,
thirdly, with that which is born from it in the gaze of the
thinker's mind. But the intermediate combinationwhich is the
second, although it is nearer to it, is yet not so like the first as
the third is. For there are two kinds of vision, the one of percep-
tion, the other of thinking. But in order that the vision of the
thinker may come to be, there is wrought for the purpose in the
memory from the vision ofperception something like it, towhich
the eye of the mind may so turn itselfin thinking, as the sight
of the eyes turns itself in perceiving to the bodily object. I
have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this
kind : one when the vision of perception is formed from the
bodily object, the other when the vision of a thinker is formed
from the memory. But I have refrained from commending
an intermediate one; because we do not commonly call it
vision, when the form which comes to be in the sense of him
who perceives, is entrusted to the memory. Yet in all cases
the will does not appear, unless as the combiner as it were
of parent and offspring ; and so, proceed from whence it may,
it can be called neither parent nor offspring.
Chap. x.—Tlie hnagincUlon also adds even to things we have not seen, those
things ivhich we have seen elsewhere.
17. But if we do not remember except what we have per^
ceived, nor think except what we remember ; why do we com-
monly think things that are false, when certainly we do not
remember falsely those things which we have perceived ; unless
it be because that will, which I have already taken pains to
show as much as I can to be the imiter and the separater of
things of this kind, leads the sight of the thinker, that is to
be formed, after its own Avill and pleasure, through the hidden
y